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ABSTRACT 
Introduction: 
The thesis entitled "Role of Central Bank in Monetary 
Management of a country with special reference to Reserve Bank of 
India" is an attempt to analyse the role of Central banks of different 
countries especially the Reserve Bank of India in their monetary 
management in the changed environment. The methods of monetary 
management vary in degree and kind between one Central brnk and 
another depending upon the particular stage of economic 
development of a country, volume and variety of its material 
resources, the make up of its banking and credit structure, the nature 
of its International financial relationship, the state of development of 
its capital market, the degree of organization and activity of its 
moncN' market and in the trend of political thought and action. But 
despite ail these variations the Central bankers all over the world are 
found with more or less the same outlook on monetary and banking 
matters. The interdependence of one country to another country has 
made the monetary management more complex. In this study, efforts 
have been made to critically examine the methodology adopted and 
objectives pursued by different central banks for the effective 
monetary management especially the Reserve Bank of India, 
There is no doubt that the conduct of monetary policy in India 
has transformed over the past 54 years, but the transition from a 
planned economy to a market economy in the 1990, sharpened the 
Reserve Bank 's monetary management dilemma of providing credit to 
both the Government and the commercial sector at a reasonable cost, 
while at the same time containing inflationary pressures. The sudden 
external shocks requires a hardening of monetary conditions in order 
to ensure orderly conditions in the financial markets, while the 
growth objective presage a softer interest rate regime, fhese 
increasing complexities of monetary management forced the Reserve 
Bank of India to adopt a multiple indicator approach in \vhich a cost 
of macroeconomic variables are monitored for the process of 
monetary policy formulation. In fact, the relative efficacy of the 
different instruments and the environment in which they have been 
applied have undergone a sea-change. Therefore, in this stud\ efforts 
have been made to analyse — 
(i) How the emphasis on various monetary management instruments 
have evolved from essentially one of direct and administered 
instruments to that of relatively indirect and market based 
instruments, 
(ii) How far the Reserve Bank of India is successful in monetary 
management and able to achieve the objectives of price stability, 
growth and financial stability. 
The data has been collected from the publication department of 
the Reserve Bank of India and the Economic Surveys of the 
Government of India. The data consists of the Bank rate changes, 
changes in the Cash Reserve Ratio (CRR), changes in the selective 
methods, interest rate changes, change in the money supply, inflation 
and the GDP growth. Efforts have been made to find the 
interdependence of different variables like inflation, GDP growth and 
money supply with the help of correlation coefficient and moving 
averages. This work is divided into five chapters covering almost 
every aspect of monetary management. 
The chapter first is introductory in nature. It deals about the genesis 
of monetary management and the evolution of central banking as a 
technique of monetary management. The basic objectives of monetary 
management like control of cyclical phenomenon, continuity of 
values, economic stability and full employment of resources have 
been dealt in this chapter. An effort have been made to have a 
comparative analysis of the operating procedures and the objectives 
pursued by different central banks in the changed environment where 
the choice of monetary arrangement depends more on the choices that 
other countries make. 
Evolution of Central Banking technique of monetary 
management in India and the birth of the Reserve bank have been 
dealt substantially in this chapter. The reform measures which are 
essential for effecti\e monetary management and to keep the 
financial structure of the country 'on an even keep have been also 
dealt in this chapter. 
Chapter second deals with the general instruments of monetary 
management. In the chapter efforts have been made to analyse the 
relative efficacy of different instrument especially in the changed 
environment. In order to analyse the relative efficacy of various 
instruments, the whole period is divided into pre-libralisation period 
and post-liberalisation period. 
The analysis shows that there is remarkable change in the use 
of different instruments. In the prc-liberalisation period the Bank 
rate was actively used upto the 70s and acted as a signaling rate. But 
gradually the bank rate was downgraded and the Cash reserve ratio 
became an active instrument of monetary management. Though the 
open market operations were in use but not actively. But in the post-
liberalisation period, which sharpened the Reserve Bank's monetary 
management dilemma, the bank rate and the open market operations 
reactivated and the role of bank rate as a "reference ra te ' , revived 
whereas, the liquidity adjustment facility (LAF) provides an interest 
rate corridor. 
Thus the analysis concludes that in the changed environment, 
the reforms in the monetary poIic}-operating framework in terms of 
instruments, procedures and institutional architecture are essential 
for efficient monetary management. Further, it concludes that though 
all the three instrument have their own merits but no single 
instrument is adequate to task, so. all the three must be employed in 
proper combination to achieve the polic> objectives. 
Chapter third deals with the selective methods of monetar} 
management. As we know that in the context of planning and 
development, selective credit control is necessary because, ii 
channelise bank credit to socially desirable and economicall}' useful 
purposes. In India the selective credit controls are in operation since 
1956 and have expanded in coverage, scope and content over (he 
period. In order to have an effective analysis the whole period is 
divided into three phases, namely, pre-nationalisation period (1956-
68), post nationalisation period (1969-90) and the post liberalization 
period (From, 1991). 
In the pre-nationalisation period (1956-68), the selective 
methods were not very much effective, the share of bank credit to 
agriculture and allied activities were very low because the banks 
were reluctant in providing credit. 
In the post-nationalisation period (1969-90) the economy was 
broadly divided into two categories, namely priority sector and non-
priority sector. Various sectors like, agriculture, small industries, 
exports, roads and water transport operators, retail trade and small 
business and education and various others were included into the 
priority sector and the targets of priority sector credit for public 
sector banks were set and revised from time to time as a matter of 
government policy and to achieve the desired objectives. Thus during 
this period there was a persistent decline in the share of bank credit 
from scheduled commercial banks to industry as a whole and to large 
and medium industry in particular. 
The post liberalisation period (1991 onwards) started with a 
severe balance of payment crisis and a high rate of inflation, 
reflecting the growing internal imbalances of 1980s. With the 
liberalization of the external sector, the management of capital flows 
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posed a fresh challenge to monetary management. During 1994-95, 
the evolution of prices and output led to a tightening of selective 
credit controls on a number of goods but with the expectations of 
bumper Kharif crop and the improvements in the price - output trend 
selective credit controls were reduced and eliminated in some cases. 
In 1996-97, with the liberalization of selective credit controls on 
bank advances against price-sensitive essential commodities, various 
commodities were exempted from selective credit controls from 
October 21 , 1996. And therefore, we can say that the selective credit 
controls were virtually eliminated in October 1996. In fact, the 
degree of success of selective credit controls are very much 
dependent upon the factors like - the extent of effective credit 
restrict ions, because, the selective credit controls are generally 
security oriented and purpose oriented. 
Chapter four deals with the impact of monetary policy on 
macroeconomic variables. There is widespread acceptance that the 
design and conduct of monetary policy has an important bearing on 
aggregate economic activity and it is being actively considered as an 
instrument of stabilization, working through aggregate demand to 
smoothen oscillations of economic activity around the desired path. 
Therefore, in this chapter analysis have been made to know, how the 
monetary policy affects output and inflation and for this correlation 
coefficient between money supply and the inflation and between 
inflation and output have been determined. Three years moving 
average graphs have been also depicted to show the interdependence 
to these variables. In this chapter an effort have been also made to 
get the transmission channel especiall}' in the changed environment 
in order to achieve the desired objecti \es. Here an attempt has been 
also made to find the trade-off between inflation and growth, and it 
has been found that there is a non-linear relationship between 
inflation and growth. 
Fifth and the final chapter devoted to the conclusion and 
suggestions. After going through the extensive study, we can say that 
in the contemporary macroeconomic thinking, there is no clear 
winner once enjoyed by Classicals. Keynesians or Monetarist. There 
is no doubt that the conduct of monetary policy shaped the process of 
financial sector reforms, but financial liberalization itself posed 
fresh challenges to the conduct of monetary management. The 
evolution of interlinked money, government securities and i'orcign 
exchange markets, posed challenges to monetar}' managemeni in 
terms of heightened risks of contagion. 
Though, price stability is generally recognised as the primary 
goal of monetary policy, but there is little evidence that inflation 
targeting on an average improves performances of output. Thus, it is 
important that Central Banks must, at any time, s imul taneoush 
pursue three objectives of price stability, growth and financial 
stability. 
Lastly, this chapter concludes that the record of the Reserve 
Bank in monetary management has been, on balance, sat isfactor\ . In 
fact, it will be good to say that the degree of credibility thai ihc 
Reserve Bank of India has earned overtime, is in itself an effective 
instrument of monetary management in meeting the future challenges. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The present study entitled "Role of Central Bank in Monetary 
Management of a Country with Special Reference to Reserve Bank of 
India" is an attempt to analyse the role of different Central banks, 
particularly, the Reserve Bank of India in managing the monetary 
system of the country especially after the liberalization and 
globalisation. 
Prior to the commencement of the twentieth century there had 
been no clearly defined concept of Central banking. Gradual l \ \ the 
control of currency and credit vested in one bank with the support of 
the State and Subject to some form of State supervision and 
participation irrespective of the stage of economic development in 
the country. But the methods of monetar>' management vary in degree 
and sometimes in kind as between one Central bank and another, 
depending upon the particular stage of economic development of a 
country, the volume and \aricty of its material resources, the makeup 
of its banking and credit structure, the nature of its international 
financial relationship, the state of de\ elopment of its capital market, 
the degree of organization and activit>' of its money market. The 
methods of Central Banks also vary in kind and in degree as between 
one period and another in accordance with the need for adjustment to 
fundamental changes in economic conditions and in the trend of 
political thought and action. Despite all these variations there lies a 
large measure of agreement in practice and Central bankers are to be 
found all over the world with more or less the same outlook on 
monetary and banking matters. 
Review of Literature: 
Deepak Mohanty, Amitava Sardar and Abha Prasad (1997); in the 
paper entitled "Perspectives of Monetary Developments and Policy in 
India", makes an attempt to capture the monetary developments, and 
the theoretical and empirical underpinnings of monetary policy, in 
particular the changing efficacy of various instruments of monetary 
policy in India. It delineates the evolution of the role of monetary 
policy from one of developmental in nature during 1950s and 1960s 
to that of neutralizing huge liquidity generated in the economy 
consequent upon weakening of fiscal balance of the Government 
during 1970s and 1980s. This was also followed by institutional 
reforms during 1990s culminating in the supplemental agreement 
between the practices of automatic monetisation of fiscal deficit. 
While analyzing these developments, the article also focuses on how 
the emphasis on various monetary policy instruments have evolved 
from essentially one of direct and administered instruments to that of 
relatively indirect and market based instruments. The analysis of 
money, output and prices in a historical perspective shows that 
unbridled growth of money supply translates largely into rise in 
prices underscoring the need for prudence in monetary management. 
Manohar Rao, M.J. (2003); the paper entitled, "Science of Monetary 
Policy - some perspectives on the Indian economy", exposit the 
monetary policies design problem within the limits of an empirical 
framework for the Indian economy. It first looks at a few of the 
theories that have been advanced to explain the stylized facts of 
economic fluctuations and then examines the main features of 
business cycles in the Indian economy over the past 50 years. 
Secondly, it empirically measures the threshold rate of inflation 
within the framework of growth-inflation trade offs and derives the 
optimal rate of monetary expansion needed to smooth out 
fluctuations and stabilize the inflation rate at its threshold level. He 
estimated the optimal rate of monetary expansion around 15 percent 
to stabilize the inflation rate at the threshold level and the 
corresponding optimal fiscal deficit, which maximizes the growth 
rate around 4 percent of GDP. 
Sayers, R.S. (1967); in his book entitled, "Modern Banking" iiave 
discussed about the economic importance of Banks. According to him 
a full discussion of the 'monetary ' influences on the country 's 
economic activity would have to include an examination of the 
behaviour of a very wide range of financial intermediaries and the 
business of the banks. But at the same time while trying to trace the 
influence of the banks on the level of total demand some regard must 
be paid to the great web of other financial claims that serve nearl\ 
but not all the purposes of money. 
Meltzer, Alan H. (1997); in his book entitled, ''On Making Policy 
More Effective Domestically and Internationally''' published from 
McMillan Press Limited, London have found that the conduct of 
monetary policy has become extremely complex in the environment 
of interdependent risks. In fact the choice of monetary arrangements 
depends more on the choices that other countries make. 
Dr. Rakesh Mohan, (Deputy Governor, RBI); in his paper entitled, 
''Challenges to Monetary Policy in a Globalising Context" published 
in the Reserve Bank of India bulletin, January 2004, have discussed 
the recent global development and the monetary policy operations. In 
this paper he emphasizes that the globalisation has expanded 
economic interdependence and interaction of countries greatly, which 
has created the need for greater coordination in terms of the design 
of appropriate institutional architecture as well as standardization 
reflected in the adoption of similar monctar\ policy approaches. 
De Kock, M.H. (1987); in his book entitled, "Central Banking" have 
discussed about the evolution of Central banking as a technique of 
monetary management. He analysed the methods adopted by different 
Central banks and concluded that the methods vary in degree and 
sometimes in kind as between one Central bank and another, 
depending upon the particular stage of economic development of a 
country, the volume and variety of its material resources, the make-
up of its banking and credit structure generally, the nature of its 
international financial relationship, the state of development of its 
capital market and the degree of organization and activity of its 
money market. But despite all these \ar ial ions there lies a large 
measure of agreement in practice, and Central bankers are to be 
found all over the world with more or less the same outlook on 
monetary and banking matters. 
Narendra Jadhav (2003); in his paper entitled, "Central Bank 
Strategies, Credibility and Independence - Global Evolution and the 
Indian Experience" have offered a comprehensive perspective on 
Central banking in India. The genesis, evolution and development of 
the Reserve Bank of India, the domestic compulsions and evolution 
of international best practices have been analysed thoroughly. 
Formulation and the conduct of monetary policy, financial stability 
and management of the changes in the payment and sett lement system 
in the changed environment have been discussed clearly and also 
highlighted the challenges and the policy dilemmas faced by the 
Central bankers around the world. Finally, he concluded that Central 
banks must, at any given time, simultaneously pursue three 
objectives of price stability, growth and financial stability. 
Thus a lot of work has been done on the monetary management 
of the Central banks and many more would be in the process. In fact 
review of these literatures helped me a lot in building the arguments 
and in setting up the objectives of the research work. 
Objectives: 
In the light of research topic, "Role of Central Bank in 
Monetary Management of a Country with Special Reference to 
Reserve Bank of India", the following objectives have been set. 
(1) To examine the relationship 
output and prices. 
between money. 
(2) To know the trade-off between inflation and growth. 
(3) To examine the efficacy of different instruments of monetary 
management after the financial sector reforms. 
(4) To analyse whether a single target, single instrument rule is 
preferable over the multiple target approach. 
(5) To know whether the monetary targeting is still feasible in the 
changed environment or not. 
Plan of Study: 
Though, the conduct of monetary policy in India has 
transformed over the past 54 years, but the transition from a planned 
economy to a market economy in the 1990s, Sharpened the Reserve 
bank 's monetary management dilemma of providing credit to both the 
Government and the commercial sector at a reasonable cost, while at 
the same time containing inflationary pressures. The sudden external 
shocks require a hardening of monetary conditions in order to ensure 
orderly conditions in the financial markets, while the growth 
objective presaged a softer interest rate regime. The increasing 
complexities of monetary management forced the Reserve Bank of 
India to adopt a multiple indicator approach in which a host of 
macroeconomic variables are monitored for the process of monetary 
policy formulation. The relative efficacies of the different 
instruments and the environment in which they have been applied 
have undergone a sea-change. The complete study has been divided 
into five chapters. 
In the First Chapter we have primarily dealt about the evolution 
of Central banking as a technique of monetary management. The 
objectives and the operating procedures of different Central banks in 
the changed environment have been also dealt. The births of the 
Reserve Bank of India and its role in the monetary management have 
also been discussed. 
The Second Chapter deals with general instruments of monetary 
management viz., Bank rate, Open market operations and Cash 
reserve ratio in detail. Their relative efficacies especially after the 
liberalization have been discussed. 
The Third Chapter deals with the selective methods of 
monetary management. In this chapter the use of different selective 
methods like, margin requirements, interest rate differential and 
moral suasion etc have been discussed in three phases — pre-
nationalisation period, post-nationalisation period and post-
liberalisation period. 
The Fourth Chapter deals with the impact of monetary policy 
on various macro-economic variables. The relationship between 
inflation, growth and money supply has been established. The 
transmission channels have been discussed and effort have been made 
to find the effective transmission channel especially when the 
economy is affected not only due to internal factors but also due to 
external shocks. 
Fifth and the Last Chapter is the summary and conclusion 
which concludes about the role of Central banks especially Reserve 
Bank of India in the monetary managem.ent after ana l \z ing and 
testing the different parameters under different circumstances 
especially after the 1990. 
Hypothesis: 
We have formulated the null hypothesis, which has to be 
accepted or rejected as per the findings: 
(i) HQ: Financial liberalization and globalisation has made the 
relationship between money, output and prices unstable and 
unpredictable, 
(ii) HQ: There is a trade-off between growth and inflation at least in 
the short-run. 
(iii) HQ: Every Central bank should pursue a single target, single 
instrument rule. 
(iv) Ho: Interest rates and exchange rate has replaced the monetary 
targeting as an anchor of monetary management. 
Research Methodology: 
Since the Research work is evaluating in nature. We have to 
evaluate the performance of the Reserve Bank in monetary 
management especially after the liberalization. Therefore all the data 
are secondary in nature, collected mainly from the Publication 
Department of the Reserve Bank of India and the Economic surveys 
of the Government of India. In order to test the different hypothesis , 
correlation coefficient has been used which shows the 
interdependence of different variables like inflation, GDP growth and 
money supply. Moving averages and graphs have been also used to 
depict the relationships among inflation, output and money supply in 
the economv. 
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MONETARY MANAGEMENT: GLOBAL EVOLUTIONS 
1.1 Genesis of monetary management: 
Monetary management is as old as money and the monetary 
system itself. The prince who minted the first coin was a monetary 
reformer in his day, and the Princes who debased their coinage to 
finance their deficits were also monetary reformers. According to 
Paul Einzig, "managed currency was not entirely unknown to the 
ancient Egyptians, Greeks and Chinese who shifted bullion to and 
from the shrines of their temples in order to counteract movements in 
the price level" . But such monetary management, or that which 
prevailed throughout the 19'^ century and until 1914, was based upon 
the monetary system, which was considerably based on Gold and 
was, therefore automatic in character. This automaticity was 
significantly curtailed during the war (1914-18) and monetary 
management also assumed a new character. In the modern sense, 
monetary management implies a deliberate policy, which aims at the 
systematic regulation of the volume of currency and credit with a 
definite objective in view. The object may be either the maintenance 
of a stable exchange rate, or the maintenance of a stable or 
moderately changing price level, or the maintenance of a stable or 
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steadily increasing volume of employment and trade. It sometimes 
necessitates suspending expansion of currency and credit or even 
reversing it. Circumstances may arise in which management implies 
an increase of interest rates, contraction of credit, reduction of 
consumers ' purchasing power, and suspension of public works 
expenditure. Thus, monetary management implies a posit ive attempt 
to regulate the volume and value of currency and credit in a way thai 
is considered to be in accordance with the interests of the increase of 
the welfare of the community, independently of the technical 
international considerations which had been in the past regarded as 
being of prime importance. 
The problem of monetary management originated into general 
prominence after the First World War, when statesmen in all 
countries were faced with the task of reconstructing a broken 
international monetary system. Two international conferences 
(Brussels in 1920 and Geneva in 1922) vigorously affirmed the 
importance of this task, while inflation in Germany and elsewhere 
seemed to point the moral. Before that the conviction was general 
that the international Gold standard was a system automatic in 
character and governed by natural laws to which it was essential that 
every national monetary system should conform. Within the 
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framework of this International Gold Mechanism Central Banking 
was but with a shapeless idea. Though some classical theorists 
assigned to it an important role in the mechanism of adjustment 
between the national and international systems, namely that of 
changing the volume of domestic money in accordance with the 
balance of payments and it was accepted as an index of monetary 
management. But beyond this, the Central Banks were considered to 
be merely the results of certain historical circumstances, which 
raised a few institutions in their respective territories to positions of 
superiority and power over their contemporary institutions either by 
virtue of the sole right to issue paper currently or by their special 
relations with the state. In due course the return of Great Britain to 
the Gold standard was acclaimed as giving a lead in the great work of 
monetary reconstruction, and in their turn other countries followed 
suit. But this represented only the beginning of the attempt at 
monetary management. Large-scale unemployment provided a 
reminder that the monetary problem - that of providing and working 
a thoroughly satisfactory currency and credit machine - cannot be 
solved easily and finally before a distant future. The tendency 
towards monetary management received a strong stimulous through 
crisis of 1931 and the following years of depression. 
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1.2 Evolution of Central Banking as a technique of monetary 
management: 
In the 18" and early 19" centuries, the thinkers, (Adam Smith. 
David Hume and David Ricardo) who had the most influence on the 
development of monetary theory, placed emphasis on money as a 
reflector rather than regulator, of levels of economic activity which 
in turn, were deemed to be determined by non-monetary factors. 
Among the classical economists, Adam Smith emphasized the role of 
a "properly regulated' banking system, which in his view would 
provide the appropriate amount of money endogenously through the 
expansion and contraction of credit. According to Smith, the 
introduction of banks and credit money would have a once and for all 
effect on economic activity by releasing for production, social capital 
previoush' tied up in stocks of money commodity. However, once the 
banking system was in place and functioning according to rules, the 
quantity of money, now endogenous to the system, would have no 
independent effect on the le\el of economic activit>. 
As a matter of fact, global thinking on monetary management 
and by implication, that on Central Banking, has c \ o l \ e d o\'cr time in 
accordance with the changing perceptions regarding the role of 
money in economic activity. In England the principles of monetary 
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management by the Central Bank were not discovered and proclaimed 
until the appearance of Walter Bagehot 's 'Lombard Street ' in 1873. 
Even then the criteria by which the Bank of England acted were 
almost entirely rules of thumb, and there was very little attempt at 
conscious control in pursuit of a consistent policy before the 
outbreak of the war. France and Germany, though they possessed 
Central Banks for all or a large part of the 19''' century, never came 
into control of so delicate and astute a mechanism of monetary 
management, partly due to the lack of large and elastic money 
markets and partly because the Bank of France and Reich Bank never 
confined themselves to serving the Member Banks and the 
government, but competed freely with other banks up and down the 
country. After the cessation of hostilities, while considering the 
restoration of pre-war international standard, the successful 
maintenance of it was pronounced to be conditional on the existence 
of Central Banks. War time exigencies had disrupted the many links 
that previously connected the different currencies of Europe. 
Inflation of prices and fluctuating exchanges had reduced banking 
almost to chaos. In addition, there were several new and intensely 
nationalistic states, each with a brand new currency, and each 
desiring to have a brand new currency policy to match. Appeals were, 
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therefore, sent out from one international conference after another 
prescribing the formula of a Central Bank for each country. At the 
international financial conference held in Brussels in 1920, one of 
the resolutions passed was that, "in countries where there is no 
Central Bank of issue one should be established". The advice of the 
Brussel ' s conference was widely accepted and as many as thirty new 
Central Banks were brought into existence between 1921-39. Under 
the leadership of the Bank of England and of the financial experts of 
the league of nations, this formula was gradually put into effect, and 
even such small entities as Estonia, Danzig and Albania were 
equipped with Central Banks. Under American inspiration the 
innovation spread to the South American States, and by the outbreak 
of world war in 1939 there was hardly a country in the world where a 
Central Bank was not either in existence or proposed. Kisch and 
Elkin assured even the undeveloped countries that, "the arguments on 
the economic side for handling over the management of the currency 
to a Central Bank are convincing. The risk for prematurity in the 
creation of a Central Banking system should not necessari ly be 
regarded as a decisive factor, because there is no influence so potent 
in the way of developing a credit system on sound and progressive 
lines as a well-founded Central Bank.^" Theodone Gregory while 
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giving evidence before, Royal Commission on Banking and Currency 
in Canada in 1933, gave a classic statement on the importance of 
Central Banking. "A Central Bank", he said, "is a center not only for 
rediscounting, but a center of moral authority in moments of crisis 
and an authority which is also capable of exerting and expressing a 
certain volume of moral critique in moments of exaggerated optimism 
or of exaggerated pessimism. " the establishment of a Central Bank 
was thus looked upon not only as an agency for economic stability, 
but also as a symbol of the economic independence of a country. 
Though the foundations of Central Banking were laid much 
before the First World War, it did not develop as a concept until the 
thirties of the twentieth century when it came to be a well-defined 
and systematic study. Many of the countries called in the help of 
experts from the older countries, mainly from Great Britain, to advise 
them on the question of the establishment of a Central Bank. Drawing 
inspiration from the prominent Central Banks already in existence, 
certain functions came to be accepted as essentially falling within 
their province and certain characteristics as fundamental to their 
integrity. In the twenties, the idea of Central Banking developed into 
a systematized study and it was found necessary to stock to its 
armoury with new method of control. By the thirties, the Central 
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Banks came closer to their respective governments, and the mode and 
nature of their operations also underwent changes in conception and 
emphasis. Parker Willis in 1936 wrote that "Central Banking 
technique tends more and more to rely upon direct control and 
intervention, and less and less upon the finer balancing of economic 
and financial forces, which was represented in the older theory of 
discount rate supervision or direction. " Further, he said in the same 
context that not only the practice of Central Banking but its theory as 
well, has drifted away from the old moorings. In fact Central banking 
crystallized itself into a new recognized idea. In this regard De Kock 
had observed, "Central Banking has become an entirely separate 
branch of banking as compared with commercial banking, investment 
banking, industrial banking and agricultural banking. It has 
developed its own code of rules and practices, and the existence of a 
science of Central Banking has been acknowledged by many. A 
clearly defined concept has been evolved. "^ Further, he writes, 
"While their (Central Banks) constitution and range of powers differ 
to no small extent, all the Central Banks show a tendency in practice 
to conform to or work up to, an almost uniform pattern in respect of 
their functions and methods. " 
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The acid test of an effective monetary management is an 
adequate adjustment of tlie amount of currency and credit to the 
requirements of production, business and trade. For this, a 
centralized control over both currency and credit is an absolute 
necessity. That is why the Central Banks, which ultimately supply 
credit and control it, are given the monopoly of currency. "The 
perfect Central Bank has the duty of nearly always swimming against 
the current of public feeling, for it is the current of public feeling, 
alternately over-optimistic and over despairing, which is more 
responsible than any other single factor for the swings of boom and 
slump. In its task of monetary management, the Central Bank is not 
for looking out and scotching incipient causes of disturbance 
emerging from the shifting sands of public psychology, but of trying 
to bring to rest a see-saw in violent oscillation. " In order to fulfill 
effectively these functions, it is necessary to arm the Central Banks 
with wide powers to control currency and credit operations of 
agencies engaged in that business and also to control institutional 
movements of capital and money. 
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1.3 Objectives of monetary management: 
A. Control of 'Cyclical' phenomenon: 
Ever since wide fluctuations in prices associated with booms 
and depressions became a chronic feature, the question of Monetary 
management has been a subject of paramount significance. Monetary 
management, therefore, aims primarily at preventing maladjustments 
occurring, that is, at eliminating the causes of recession. To achieve 
this 'investment finance ' needs to be regulated through appropriate 
variations in the rate of interest in the capital market. The rate of 
interest is a vital link that connects the volume of money and 
investment in a given economy. The success or otherwise of a 
monetary policy largely depends on the influence which the rate of 
interest can be expected to wield on the investment and consumption 
decisions of the community. According to Golden Weiser the broad 
objective of monetary management "is to assure the distribution of 
the monetary flow or income in such a way as to place in the hands 
of consumers sufficient means to purchase the output of consumer 
industries and in the hands of investors funds adequate to maintain 
the existing productive plant and exposed it sufficiently to meet the 
consumption requirements of a growing population with a rising 
standard of living. " 
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B. Continuity of values: 
Monetary management to be effective must provide the basis of 
'continuity of value'. It carries the implication that general price 
movements, if any, should not exceed movements in the general level 
of costs resulting from technical changes. In a country doing a large 
export and import trade, prices and costs are strongly affected by 
exchange movements, and not merely by what happens within the 
national boundaries. For such a country, monetary doctors should 
also obtain as far as possible, stability in exchange rate. Continuity 
of values and exchange stability depend largely on the preservation 
of balanced conditions in economic activity at home, and on an 
international machinery which would enable the main financial 
centers to work together not only in controlling credit but also in 
keeping the flow of lending more consistent, and in providing 
temporary financial help under conditions of emergency. 
C. Economic stability: 
Proper monetary management through the condition of supply 
of money can explore the possibilities of increasing production 
without affecting the level of consumption of the community. The 
monetary authorities can bring about the development of productive 
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resources - actual or potential by financing them with new money, 
without any risk of inflation, for the increasing stock of money will 
be simultaneously matched by growing output, even though the 
interval of time may temporarily disturb the existing price structure 
of the economic system. In fact, the whole problem of economic 
development is very intimately and closely linked with successful 
and effective monetary management. Monetary management is 
supposed to regulate the availability, cost and use of money, both in 
aggregates and segments so as to make the maximum contribution to 
a high level of economic stability. 
D. Full employment of resources: 
The ultimate objective of monetary management is to achieve 
and to maintain permanently a condition of full employment of 
resources. For this purpose monetary policy takes as its basis the 
Keynesian idea that effective demand determines employment. 
Effective demand is made up of consumption demand and investment 
demand. The Keynesian proposition - that as income increases 
consumption demand becomes increasingly inelastic - is also useful 
in this connection. Monetary policy and government policv 
concentrate on stimulating demand on both the investment front and 
the consumption front. The central monetary authority by stimulating 
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effective demand can bring out full employment of resources. The 
obvious objective of monetary policy, therefore is to attain an 
equilibrium between saving and investment at the point of full 
employment. 
1.4 Monetary management in globalising context : 
The global developments have transformed the environment in 
which monetary policy operate, throwing up opportunities as well as 
cliallcnges. Globalisation has expanded economic interdependence 
and interaction of countries greatly. This has created the need for 
greater coordination in terms of the design of appropriate 
institutional architecture as well as standardization reflected in the 
adoption of similar monetary policy approaches. Structural changes 
associated with globalisation have increased the uncertainty in 
interpreting macroeconomic indicators regarding the state of the 
economy. Financial markets, driven by massive cross-border capital 
flows and the information technology revolution, immediately 
transfer the valuation of risks associated with uncertainty across the 
globe and become contagions. 
Thus the conduct of monetary management becomes extremely 
complex in such an en\ironment of interdependent risks. Though the 
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monetary management is conducted towards achieving domestic 
objectives, Central Banks have to follow developments across the 
world carefully. According to Meltzer, "more than ever before, the 
choice of monetary arrangements depends on the choices that other 
countries make. " 
A. Objec t ives : 
Though there are so many objectives of monetary policy, but 
the attainment of price stability is the dominant or prime objective of 
monetary policy. It rests on the assumption that volatility in prices 
creates uncertainty in economic decision-making. Rising prices 
affects savings adversely while they make speculative investments 
more attractive. The most important contribution of the financial 
system to an economy is its ability to augment savings and allocate 
resources more efficiently. A regime of rising prices, thus, clearly 
vitiates the atmosphere for promotion of savings and allocation of 
investment. Further, the domestic inflation rate also has a bearing on 
the exchange rate of the currency. Besides, there is a social 
dimension, particularly in developing economies where it affects 
adversely the poorer sections of the society who have no hedges 
against inflation. But despite a generalized recognition of price 
stability as the primary goal of monetary policy, the objective of 
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output stabilization has been prominently pursued by Central Banks 
all over the world, both in terms of preventing economic overheating 
and providing stimulus to faster recovery from recessions. Several 
developing countries have also used monetary measures to defend the 
exchange rate, Thus, constrained discretion seems to be the preferred 
rule for most Central Banks today. 
A number of Central Banks, beginning with New Zealand 
(1989), adopted price stability as the sole goal of monetary policy 
during the 1990s. Presently, there are 18 inflation targeters and many 
others, including the US Federal Reserve are outside the fold. The 
1999 Bank of England survey of monetary policy frameworks reveals 
the continuing diversity of Central Bank objectives. While price 
stability emerged as the main/ other important policy objective in 50 
out of the 77 Central Banks as many as 54 Central Banks reported 
exchange rate management to be the main/ other important policy 
objective. 
B. Intermediate target: 
Besides the objectives for monetary policy there are other 
issues connected with the transmission mechanism of monetary 
policy actions. The Central Banks of advanced economies have 
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experimented with various intermediate targets in order to influence 
the economy in general and prices in particular. In choosing 
appropriate targets, Central Banks usually keep three major aspects 
in view: First, the ability to influence the target variable in a 
reasonably predictable manner. Secondly, the target must show a 
stable relationship with the end objective of monetary policy. 
Thirdly, the target must lead to the final objectives. 
The monetary policy mechanism holds the key in determining 
the target. If variables at the beginning of the transmission process 
are selected, the target may be become controllable but may not show 
a strong influence on the goal variable. At the other extreme, the 
final objectives that lie at the end of the transmission process could 
also be targeted. In such cases, however, the monetary authority may 
have little control over the target. The middle option could be to 
adopt intermediate targets (such as money growth or exchange rate) 
which could lie somewhere at the middle of the transmission process. 
The importance assigned to targets vis-a-vis objectives in the design 
of the monetary policy strategy is particularly critical because a mere 
achievement of target while missing the objective could erode the 
credibility of monetary management. With the observed instability 
of the money demand function several Central Banks have been 
26 
disenchanted with monetary targeting and have accordingly either 
switched over to a 'menu ' or 'check list approach' or given up 
monetary targeting altogether. As per 1999 Bank of England survey 
of monetary frameworks, 43 out of 50 Central Banks viewed 
monetary aggregates as relevant intermediate targets while only 
seven Central Banks preferred the interest rate as intermediate 
targets. In developed economies, an alternative to monetary targeting 
has been the interest rate primarily due to the fact that interest rates 
in those countries play a more important role in equil ibrating 
markets. Various segments of the financial markets are closely 
integrated with interest rates in the different markets mutually 
influencing one another. The "impossible trinity", i.e., 
incompatibili ty between fixed exchange rate regime, open capital 
account and independent monetary policy is well recognized by the 
Central Banks all over the world. 
The growing complexities of macroeconomic management is 
now leading a number of Central Banks to monitor a number of 
macroeconomic indicators rather than centre monetary policy 
decisions around nominal anchors such as money, interest rates and 
the exchange rates. The management information system of a number 
of Central Banks, including the European Central Bank, the Bank of 
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Mexico and the South African Reserve Bank, has now been 
broadened to a large set of macroeconomic variables, often including 
leading indicators, in response to the growing complexities of 
monetary management. 
C. Operating procedures: 
The operating procedures of monetary policy have been 
changing the world over in response to financial liberalization. The 
key challenge before the current monetary management is lo 
modulate liquidity conditions in the financial markets consistent not 
only with the macroeconomic objectives but also with the market 
outcomes. A number of Central Banks set formal/ informal bands for 
the overnight interest rate. Such monetary policy impulses travel to 
real activity if inter bank markets are deep enough and if the interest 
rate structure, as a whole, is sufficiently sensitive to movements at 
the short end. The strategy of liquidity management followed by a 
number of Central Banks now broadly follows a two-step procedure 
of estimating market liquidity, autonomous of policy action to 
initiate action in terms of open market operations and interest rate 
signals to steer monetary conditions. But the actual framework 
adopted by a country to manage liquidity vary in terms of the 
specific aspects of their operations. In fact, the operating procedures 
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of monetary policy of most Central Banks are now beginning to 
converge to variants of three closely related paradigms: 
(i) A number of Central Banks, including the US Federal Reserve 
(since 1992), estimate the demand for bank reserves and then carry 
out open market operations to target short-term interest rates (the 
Federal Funds Rate in case of the USA). 
(ii) A second set of Central Banks, including the Bank of Japan 
(since March 2000), estimate market liquidity and carryout open 
market operations to target bank reserves, while allowing interest 
rates to adjust. 
(iii) A third and growing number of Central Banks, including the 
European Central Bank, modulates monetary conditions in terms of 
both the quantum and price f liquidity, through a mix of open market 
operat ions, standing facilities and minimum reserve requirement and 
changes in the policy rate, but do not announce pre-set money or 
interest targets. 
Central Banks in most emerging market economies follow one 
of the three leading paradigms. The Bank of Mexico estimates the 
demand for bank reserves and conducts open market operations to 
achieve a target level of the banks ' settlement balances with itself. 
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allowing interest rates to adjust. The Bank of Korea switched to an 
interest rate target in 1998, through open market operations 
conducted on the basis of estimated demand for bank reserves. The 
Bank of Thailand (BOT) manages market liquidity through daily 
repurchase market operations, and foreign exchange swaps 
supplemented by interest rate signals through the fortnightly 
repurchase rate. The operating procedures of certain Central banks 
are discussed in detail below. 
1. European Central Bank (ECB): 
The monetary management policy of the European Central Bank 
(ECB) is governed by a monetary policy strategy and an operational 
framework. The operational framework is a set of instruments and 
procedures with which European Central Bank strives to maintain 
short-term interest rates in conformity with the monetary policy 
strategy. In order to achieve the final .objective of price s tabi l i t \ , the 
European Central Bank conducts its monetary policy through three 
types of instruments, namely, open market operations (OMOs), 
standing facilities and minimum reserve requirement. 
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(i) Open market operations (OMOs): 
Open market operations (OMOs) are conducted to maintain 
short-term interest rates within a well-defined corridor, to manage 
liquidity on daily basis and to provide signal of the stance of 
monetary policy to the market. It is classified into four categories 
namely, main refinancing operations, longer term refinancing 
operations, fine tuning operations and structural operations. 
The main refinancing operations (MROs), which are liquidity 
injecting (i.e., reverse repo) in nature are held every week in 
multiple price auctions format with a maturity of two weeks. It 
constitute the core of the open market operations by which ECB not 
only provides bulk of the refinancing to the financial sector but also 
reflect the stance of the monetary policy and serves as the benchmark 
for deciding the rates on standing facilities which in turn provide 
corridor to overnight interest rates. 
Although the main refinancing operations (MROs) are 
conducted on weekly basis, the 12 national Central Banks (NCBs) are 
required to provide their daily forecast of liquidity for individual 
autonomous factors, namely, currency in circulation, government 
deposits and other autonomous factors (net) to the European Central 
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Bank (ECB) by 9.30 A.M. which are amalgamated by the latter for 
the whole of the Eurosystem. In order to alleviate the impact of 
uncertainty arising from fluctuations in autonomous factors in the 
overall liquidity situation in the Eurosystem, except for the forecast 
of excess reserves, all other relevant information is provided to the 
market by the European Central Bank (ECB) - the most important 
being the estimate for reserve requirements published a few days 
after the start of the monthly maintenance period. The assessment of 
liquidity condition for the entire banking system constitutes the key 
element for estimating the benchmark allotment rate of each MRO, 
i.e., minimum bid rate. Since this rate reflects the monetary policy 
stance, it is set by the Governing Council. 
The longer term refinancing operations are administered on a 
monthly frequency with a maturity of three months. These operations 
represent only a limited part of the aggregate refinancing volume of 
the ECB. The fine-tuning operations which are mainly in the nature 
of liquidity injecting operations are intended smoothing out interest 
rate fluctuations that may arise out of unexpected liquidity needs in 
the economy e.g., millennium changeo\cr . 9/1 1 events etc. Their 
frequency of operations and maturity period are not standardized. In 
addition, structural operations are carried out through issuance of 
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debt certificates, reverse transactions and outright transactions. 
These are aimed at adjusting the structural position of the 
Eurosystem vis-a-vis the financial sector. Their frequency can be 
regular or irregular. 
(ii) Standing facilities: 
The standing facilities promote injection and absorption of 
overnight liquidity at the initiative of market participants. The rates 
on standing facilities confer a corridor within which overnight rates 
are allowed to fluctuate. Standing facilities are of two type -
marginal lending facility and deposit facility. In normal 
circumstances, ECB provides unlimited under marginal lending 
facility, the interest rate of which provides a ceiling to the overnight 
market interest rates. Such interest rate is set at 100 basis points 
(bps) over the minimum bid rate accepted under main refinancing 
operations (MROs). Such a rate forces participants to fund their 
posit ions from overnight market and/or from MROs of ECB in the 
first place and turn to the marginal lending facility only as a matter 
of last resort. These are granted either in the form of overnight 
repurchase agreements or as overnight collateralized loan. The 
deposit facility on the other hand enables participants to deposit 
unlimited amount to their accounts in respective national Central 
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Banks. The interest rate is set at 100 bps lower than the minimum bid 
rate accepted under MROs and no collateral is given to counterparty 
in exchange for these deposits. 
2. Bank of England: 
The main aim of the Bank of England's operations in sterling 
money market is to implement the monetary policy committee's 
interest rate decisions while meeting the liquidity requirements and 
thereby contributing to the stability of the banking system as a 
whole. In its money market operations, the Bank of England provides 
the liquidity needed by the banking system for same day settlement 
and enables the settlement banks to achieve positive end-of-day 
balances on these accounts. In this way, it acts as the marginal 
supplier of money to the banking system enabling effective system-
wide liquidity management under normal market conditions. 
The refinancing provided by the Bank of England ensures that 
the banking system almost always has a net shortage of funds each 
day, which is conducted via repo transactions usually having a 
maturity of two weeks. It seeks to provide the system's daily 
liquidity requirement at its principal round of operations at 9:45 
A.M. and 2:30 P.M. at the official repo rate set by the monetary 
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policy committee. If liquidity is required later in the day, then 
further rounds of operations conducted at 3:30 P.M. and 4:20 P.M. 
and liquidity is provided usually at a penal rate of interest. The Bank 
of England closely monitors various flows across its balance sheet in 
order to know how much liquidity to supply to market part icipants 
each day. To facilitate this, it publishes a forecast of the daily system 
liquidity shortage (the expected amount of refinancing likely to be 
required) on its wire service pages each day. 
II" there is a forecast of the shortage of liquidity in the market 
and the shortage exceeds minimum threshold, then the Bank of 
England invites its counterparties to submit offers for repos and/ or 
outright sales of bills. Counterparties willing to part icipate in the 
round have five minutes to bid for the funds that they wish to obtain 
through repo and/or outright sales of bills. At the 9:45 A.M. round, 
the Bank of England does not relieve all of the forecast shortage 
since it may need to revise slightly its forecast during the course of 
the day in the light of updated information and a similar process is 
repeated at the next round of operations at 2:30 P.M. On the other 
hand if the forecast surplus exceeds the minimum threshold, tenders 
are held at both 9:45 A.M. and 2:30 PM or a single tender is held at 
2:30 P.M. 
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The Bank of England makes an overnight lending facility 
available at 3:30 P.M., if there is still a residual market shortage and 
the rate is set normally at 100 basis points above the official repo 
rate. This is intended to encourage the market to participate fully in 
the principal rounds of two-weeks operations at 9:45 A.M. and 2:30 
P.M. The Bank of England also makes available a daily overnight 
deposit facility at 3:30 P.M., which provides counterparties the 
opportunities to place collateralized overnight deposits with the Bank 
of England. It helps to moderate undue softness in the overnight 
market interest rates at the end of the day. 
3. Federal Reserve System (USA/ Federal Reserve Banks): 
The Federal Reserve replaced two of its discount window 
programmes - adjustment credit and extended credit - with new 
primary credit and secondary credit programmes in January. 
(i) Primary credit programme: 
Under this programme, Reserve Banks extend short-term credit 
to eligible depository institutions at a rate of 100 basis points above 
the Federal Open Market Committee's target for the Federal Funds 
rate. The important goal of the primary credit programme is to reduce 
inst i tut ions ' reluctance to use the window as a source of back-up. 
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short-term liquidity. It acts as the Federal Reserve 's principal safety 
valve for ensuring adequate liquidity in the banking system. By and 
large, primary credit is extended on a very short-term basis, usually 
overnight. But sometimes, it may be extended for up to a few weeks 
to small institutions that meet eligibility requirements. The primary 
credit programme does not require institutions to seek alternative 
sources of funds before requesting occasional short-term advances. 
Generally, Reserve Banks do not question depository institutions 
about their reasons for borrowing primary credit except in unusual 
circumstances. But the institution must have the necessary collateral 
arrangements in order to utilize the primary credit programme. The 
confidential nature of Capital adequacy, assets quality management, 
earnings liquidity systems and control model (CAMELS) and 
Strength of Support Assessment (SOSA) ratings, regulators do not 
permit depository institutions to disclose publicly their primary 
credit eligibility. 
(ii) Secondary credit programme: 
Federal Reserve Banks extend secondary credit to depository 
institutions that fails in getting primary credit in order to assist in an 
inst i tut ions ' timely return to a reliance on traditional funding sources 
or in the resolution of its financial difficulties. It entails a higher 
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level of Reserve Bank administration and oversight than primary 
credit and the rate is set at 50 bps above the primary credit rate. This 
becomes necessary as less sound borrowers are riskier and might 
have an incentive to use discount window borrowings to expand their 
balance sheets in a manner that might distort resource allocation, and 
the higher rate on secondary credit will reduce this incentive. 
4. Bank of Mexico: 
The Banco de Mexico is constitutionally mandated to guarantee 
the stability of the national currency's purchasing power. Monetary 
policy decisions are announced on predetermined dates, accompanied 
by press releases explaining the reasons that motivate any changes to 
the monetary policy stance. Though the bank approves that inflation 
is essentially determined by monetary expansion in the medium term, 
the day-to-day monetary management essentially focuses on adjusting 
market liquidity to impact monetary conditions, consistent with the 
market outcome. It follows a different of the multiple indicator 
approach whereby a wide range of economic indicators are monitored 
as a fundamental part of the inflation targeting framework. 
The Bank of Mexico uses, as its primary operational target, the 
average level of the banks settlement balances with itself - the so 
called zero-average reserve requirement system - and leaves the 
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market free to determine the equilibrium interest rates. In order to 
signal its monetary policy intentions, it announces, on a daily basis, 
the level of the accumulated balance of total daily balances held by 
commercial banks with it for the end of the computation period. It 
participates in the money market at noon on every business day with 
previous information on all operations affecting the balances of 
commercial banks current accounts, except for cash deposits or 
withdrawals made by credit institutions. This is so because the 
Central Bank credits (or debits) banks' current accounts on the same 
day when, without prior notice, banks deposit the bills taken from the 
public in (or withdraw cash from) the bank. Therefore, every day the 
bank has to forecast changes in the demand for bills and coins in 
order to offset such changes by means of its intervention in the 
money market. In order to manage liquidity, the Central Bank 
intervenes in the money markets, offering credit, deposits or 
repurchase agreements, or carrying out direct purchases and sales of 
government securities through auctions. The Bank 's monetary policy 
signals are interpreted in terms of the accumulated balance 
projections rather than the actual. A zero accumulated balances 
objective indicates the Bank's intentions to fully satisfy the demand 
for currency at market interest rates, and thus to supply the necessary 
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resources, whereas, a negative accumulated balances objective, i.e. a 
"short", reflects the policy intention not to supply the banking sector 
with all the funds requested at market interest rates. 
5, Bank of Thailand: 
Thailand diverted its monetary policy framework from 
monetary targeting approach to inflation targeting (IT) approach with 
a target set for the come inflation, on a quarterly basis. By setting 
the 14-day repurchase rate as a key policy rate, the Bank of Thailand 
implements its monetary policy. It signals a shift in the monetary 
policy stance by the declaration of a change in the fortnightly 
repurchase rate. Through two instruments, namely (a) daily 
repurchase rate, and (b) foreign exchange swaps, the Bank of 
Thailand undertakes its financial market transactions for the purpose 
of the conduct of monetary policy. The fortnightly repurchase rate 
acts as an interest rate signal, whereas the daily repurchase rates are 
market determined. A system of primary dealers and selected 
financial institutions play a key role in the auction and distribution 
of government securities, which provides the Bank of Thailand 
another channel of liquidity control. 
Thailand migrated from a pegged exchange rate regime to a 
managed floating exchange rate regime in 1997, which has provided 
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it a greater leeway for pursuing an independent domestic monetary 
policy. As the Bank of Thailand followed a floating exchange rate 
regime, the capital inflows into the Thai stock market, apart from 
other external factors, led to an appreciation of the Thai baht by 3.3 
percent in 2002. Prevalence of easy liquidity conditions in the 
financial system forces to reduce the fortnightly repurchase rate by 
25 basis points in January 2002. The average one-day repurchase 
rate, which was below the overnight inter-bank rate also decreases 
from 1.74 percent to 1.62 per cent during the same period. 
Thus the Bank of Thailand's conduct of liquidity management 
operation is sets through the 14-day repurchase rate and not through 
the one-day repurchase rate. In fact, the one-day repurchase rate 
along with the other money market rates automatically adjust 
synchronously with the policy rate. 
6. The People's Bank of China (PBC)'s: 
Though the Chinese economy has performed well, the main 
problem facing it has been an excessive expansion of its broad money 
at a year on year growth of 18.8 percent in August 2003, outgrowing 
the sum of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and Consumer Price Index 
(CPI) increase by 12.8 percentage points in the first half of 2003. 
The basic strategy of the People 's Bank of China (PBC) 's in tackling 
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the problem of excess liquidity has been by conducting "sterilization 
operations" through the issuance of Central Bank bills, which are the 
short-term bounds issued by the PBC. Though the issuance of Central 
Bank bills was the main instrument in managing short-term liquidity 
propagated through foreign exchange inflows, the People ' s Bank of 
China (PBC) recognizes the 'sterilisation limit' of this instrument 
and thus necessarily coordinates the issuance operation of Central 
Bank bills through an upward adjustment in the reserve requirements 
ratio. Recognizing the sterilization limit of the Central Bank bills in 
the context of ever increasing foreign exchange inflows, the PBC 
raised the reserve ratio by one percentage point to 7 percent on 
September 21 , 2003. Apart from these two instruments, the third 
instrument used by the PBC is the discount window. In the context of 
raising the reserve ratio, with a view to ensure that the national 
credit requirements do not suffer, the PBC would expand its 
refinancing and rediscount to maintain a steady credit growth. The 
assurance of the PBC to implement a sound and steady monetary 
policy together with flexible conduct of open market operations, 
according to the conditions of liquidity, to balance the frequency of 
issuance of Central Bank bills would facilitate formation of stable 
expectations thereby fostering stable money market rates. 
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7. Bank of Korea: 
A paradigm shift in the monetary policy occurred when 
inflation targeting was introduced under the revised Bank of Korea 
Act, from April 1998. The operating target shifted to an overnight 
call money interest rate from the hitherto framework based on bank 
reserves with broad money targeting and the open market operations 
got the most important place in the monetary policy toolkit. The shift 
of operating target from bank reserves to the overnight call rate was 
not taken at a particular point of time; rather, it evolved as a part of 
policy response in the aftermath of the 1997 financial crisis , when 
interest rates were hiked in the defence of the exchange rate. Despite 
having a purely market based liquidity management framework, the 
Bank of Korea (BOK) continues to provide sector-specific refinance. 
To assist the signaling of its policy intentions as well as to stabilize 
the short-term interest rates, the Bank of Korea introduced Liquidity 
Adjustment Loan System in June 2000 with interest rate somewhat 
below the target overnight call rate. It has been lowering Cash 
Reserve Requirements (CRR) in accordance with shift to indirect 
instruments, however, the monetary policy committee is empowered 
to raise CRR up to 50 percent as well as impose marginal CRR of 
between 50% and 100 percent. Moreover, it does not remunerate CRR 
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balances after 1987, mainly on the ground that the cost to banks of 
maintaining CRR can be viewed, as payment for this service by the 
Bank of Korea. 
The Bank of Korea forecasts the supply of reserves vis-a-vis 
demand for reserves and undertakes open market operations (OMOs) 
accordingly. The open market operations are chiefly in the nature of 
repos rather than outright sales/ purchases. Since the volume of the 
government and public bounds had been inadequate to permit OMOs, 
the BOK has been issuing its own bonds - Monetary Stabilisation 
Bonds (MSBs) for more than four decades (since 1961) of different 
maturities starting from 14 days and going upto two years, in which 
the two years MSBs dominate the total issuance, with a share of 
almost three fourth in total. Most of the OMOs are carried out 
through a process of competitive bidding while MSBs are also sold 
over the counter at a set price. The Bank of Korea sets its reserve 
price when it invites competitive tenders. At the time of issuance of 
MSBs the reserve price becomes the floor (ceiling in case of interest 
rates) and vice versa for repo purchases. Table-1.1 shows the 
objectives pursued and operating procedures of various Central banks 
around the world. 
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1.5 Evolution Of Central Banking Technique Of Monetary 
Management In India - A Historical Retrospect 
1.5.1 Early Currency Controversies: 
Monetary management as a technique of Central Banking 
control on volume, cost and direction of credit and currency in order 
to determine their impact on trade and industry in the country did not 
become really apparent till the thirties of the twentieth century when 
the Reserve Bank appeared on the monetary map of India. Prior to 
that; all the emphasis was on currency problems and management of 
money and monetary affairs were strictly restricted to the regulation 
of means and methods of coinage and currency. When East India 
Company was on the scene there were as many as 994 different coins 
of Gold, Silver and Copper of varying weights, denominations and 
fineness were in circulation. In 1835, a uniform currency was 
established whereby the Silver-rupee, weighting 180 grains, out of 
which 165 grains were pure Silver was adopted as the standard coin 
for the whole of British India '° . In fact this was the beginning of 
management in the monetary field of the country. 
As a result of this important currency management, the 
institution of indigenous money lending suffered a considerable 
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setback and a number of modern banks were established, among those 
the most important were the Presidency Banks of Bengal, Bombay 
and Madras, which acted as bankers to the East India Company and 
had the right of note-issue in their respective presidency towns. In 
1862, the right of note-issue by private banks was finally abolished 
and the management was taken over by the Government . This may 
be said to be the second stage in the currency management in India. 
In 1873, when the free mintage of Silver were abandoned by 
countries forming the Latin Union, marked the commencement of a 
continuous fall in the Gold value of Silver. India, being on the Silver 
standard, attracted the depreciating white metal to the point of 
surfeit. The continued fall in the Gold price of Silver caused repeated 
embarrassment to the Government of India. The consequent fall in 
exchange not only upset trade and tended to discourage the influx of 
much-needed capital from England in India, but also caused a serious 
direct loss to the Government in making their remittances to meet 
their sterling obligations in England. Therefore, mints were closed 
down for the unrestricted coinage of rupee in 1893 with a view to 
introducing the Gold Standard. 
The Fowler Committee was in favour of the establishment of a 
Gold currency in India a well as a Gold standard. They reported, "We 
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are in favour of making the British Sovereign a legal tender and a 
current coin in India. We also consider that at the same time, the 
Indian mints should be thrown open to the unrestricted coinage of 
Gold. The result would be that, under identical conditions, the 
sovereign would be coined and would circulate both at home and in 
India. To the effective establishment in India of a Gold standard and 
currency based on the principles of the free inflow and out flow of 
Gold, we recommend these measures for adoption '. But the 
backwardness of our banking arrangements, the habits and the 
suspicions of the people, the infancy of cooperation - all retarded 
the possibilities of introducing Gold standard with Gold currency in 
the country. In their attempts to implement the Gold policy, as 
recommended by the Gold experts, the government steadily and 
unconsciously passed on to the Gold Exchange Standard. The 
emphasis of monetary management naturally and appropriately 
shifted from 'Gold' to 'exchange stability', which brought into force 
the necessity of central control over currency and exchange in the 
country. " 
1.5.2 The 'Dogma' of Central Monetary Control: 
The idea of establishing a Central Monetary Authority on all 
India basis was conceived as early as 1836 ", but it actually got 
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revived with the decision to adopt Gold standard in the country. In 
1898, when the Fowler Committee considered the adoption of Gold 
standard in the country as an 'automatic mechanism ' to balance 
international indebtedness arising through trade, a Central Bank was 
conceived as a 'cog' in the automatic machinery of the Gold standard 
to eradicate unfavourable balance of trade. Hambro in his 
memorandum to the 'Fowler Committee', said that, "the success of 
the recommendations of the committee will very much depend on the 
banking wants of the country being assisted in times of pressure, and 
curtailed in times of slackness, and this could only be done by the 
establishment of some institutions having ample facilities at its 
disposal ' ' ' . By 1913, looking to the necessity of imparting both 
internal and external stability in the value of monetary unit, the 
arguments in favour of a Central Banking and Monetary Authority 
gained its momentum. But before it could materialize, the First 
World War ensued and all proposals on currency and banking 
smothered in its smoke. The war brought to prominence many 
economic truths, while it disproved some of the pet theories of 
economists. It left quite a legacy of difficulties and solved many 
important problems. In the case of India, the war demonstrated the 
weak joints in our banking armour and the happy results of a 
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coordinated policy on the part of the various banks. It was well 
realized that alone and unaided, no individual Presidency Bank would 
have withstood the strong and effective competition of the immigrant 
banks. With this background the Imperial Bank of India came into 
existence with the amalgamation of three Presidency Banks in 
1921.' The amalgamation was largely the outcome of 
reapproachment on the part of the Banks themselves, to whom the 
events and experiences of the war brought a broader out look on the 
banking problems of the country. 
The Bank was recognized from the very beginning as a semi-
public institution with provisions for a certain measure of control by 
the Government. The management of the public debt and all general 
banking business of the government were vested in the bank. The 
bank was to hold hereafter all the treasury balances. In the Central 
Banking tradition, the bank was expected to play the role of a 
bankers bank, holding their cash balances, rediscounting their bills 
and assisting them in times of crisis. At the same time the Imperial 
Bank was permitted to transact the same kind of commercial banking 
business, which it had inherited from the Presidency Banks. The 
imperial bank was thus designed to represent in itself a peculiar 
blend of central and commercial banking. With increased resources 
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and government banking behind, it was expected that it would 
become a sanctuary for the struggling banks. Enormous capital and 
massive size would enable it to secure controlling influence and act 
as the recognized and responsible leader. Conducting sound banking 
in times of stress as well as ease, it was expected that it would create 
a sense of security and confidence in the public. The Imperial Bank 
was expected to be the friend, philosopher and guide of the banks, 
rediscounting their bills and satisfying their wants for more credit 
currency. Besides, welding the banking system into a coordinated 
whole, it was expected to secure greater stability of business owing 
to greater activity and mobility of reserve administered by it. But the 
Bank failed in its mission of credit management. It never enabled the 
government to develop a currency policy in encouraging the use of 
hundis and internal bills of exchange. 
1.5.3 The 'Birth' of the Reserve Bank of India: 
Prompted by the failings and shortcomings of the Imperial 
Bank, a common sentiment grew in favour of its dethronement, and 
establishment of an independent Central Bank without commercial 
banking functions, which would not compete with the commercial 
banks of the country. The belief was general that the currency and 
the credit should rest in the hands of one single authority for the 
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effective development of trade and industry. In 1926, the Hilton 
Young Commission had vigorously recommended the establishment 
of a Reserve Bank while giving proposals for the future monetary 
setup. The commission discovered the "inherent weakness of a 
system in which the control of currency and credit is in the laws of 
the separate authorities whose policies may be widely divergent and 
in which the currency and the banking reserves are controlled and 
managed separately one from the other . " 
In faithful compliance to the commission's recommendations a 
Bill to form a Central Bank was finally placed before the legislative 
assembly by Sir Basil Blackett, the Finance Member, on 25 January 
1927, which was the greatest measure of financial liberalism ever 
offered to the Indian people. In the Bill the Bank was designed as a 
shareholders' Bank "free from political pressure and concerned only 
with the main finance of monetary stability in the country"'^. But 
after acrimonious and kaleidoscopic discussion and the Reserve Bank 
Bill of 1927 was eventually dropped. The Report of the Central 
Banking Enquiry Committee published in 1931, laid strong emphasis 
on the early establishment of a Reserve Bank. The issues again came 
up when changes in the central government machinery involving the 
transfer of the financial responsibility to an Executive responsible to 
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a Federal legislature were being discussed. The Second Report of 
Federal Structure Committee described that an independent Reserve 
Bank was a condition precedent to the success of the new 
constitution so that no room should be left for doubts as to the ability 
of India to maintain her financial stability and credit both at home 
1 O 
and abroad. Thus the successful institution and functioning of a 
Reserve Bank was made a prerequisite to Federation , and it was on 
the basis of that the Reserve Bank Bill was resuscitated after the 
necessary transformation and passed into law early in 1934. 
The passing of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934 opened a 
new era in the monetary organization of India. It constituted "a 
Reserve Bank of India to regulate the issue of bank-notes and the 
keeping of reserves with a view to securing monetary stability in 
India and to operate the currency and credit system of the country to 
its advantage. 
1.5.4 Constitutional 'Frame' of the Bank: 
With a view to understand the role and achievements of the 
Reserve Bank of India in the field of monetary management, it is 
both necessary and feasible to scan the constitutional frame within 
which the bank was originally set into function. Though the Bank 
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deviated from its constitutional path to be swaye3"'''w1fh the currents 
of time and conditions, establishing new ways of life and methods of 
work, the original constitution did have its mark on all its actions. To 
know its achievements and failings in the field of monetary 
management it will be necessary to review briefly the constitutional 
background, against which the bank was put to act and play by its 
architects. 
The Reserve Bank, as envisaged in the bill, was originally set 
up as a shareholders bank with a share capital of Rs. 5 crore which 
were divided into 5 lakh equity shares of Rs. 100 each in 1935. In 
order to prevent centralization of the equity shares in the hands of 
the few people, the Reserve Bank of India was nationalized on 
January 1, 1949. 
The general administration and direction of Reserve Bank of 
India is managed by a Central Board of Directors consisting of 20 
members which includes one Governor, four Deputy governors, one 
Government official appointed by the union government of India to 
give representation to important strata in economic life of the 
country. Besides, four directors arc nominated by the union 
government to represent local boards. Apart from the central board 
there are four local boards also and their head offices are situated in 
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Mumbai, Chennai, Kolkata and New Delhi. Five members of Local 
Boards are appointed by the Union go\ernment for a period of four 
years. The local boards work according to the instructions and orders 
given by the central board of directors, and from time to time they 
also lender useful advice on important matter. 
The Reserve Bank was designed to act as an efficient 'lender of 
the last resort' as a 'shock-absorber' and as 'an emergency bank' to 
which all eyes may be turned for help, advice and guidance. It had to 
keep the financial structure of the counlr\' on an even keel. The using 
of currency and the running of the credit structure in the interests of 
the nation were the specific duties entrusted to the Reserve Bank. In 
the capacity of a Central Bank, the Reserve Bank was assigned the 
following specific functions: 
a) to manage the note-issue 
b) to regulate the banking system 
c) to act as government 's banker, agent and advisor 
d) to maintain the stability of the external value of rupee. 
The statutory function of note-issue was assigned to the Bank 
on the monopoly basis under section 22 of the Reserve Bank of India 
Act, 1934. The method of note issue adopted in India was originally 
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based upon the Proportional Reserve System. In July 6, 1956 the 
Reserve Bank has been authorized to issue notes on the basis of 
Minimum Reserve Method against the minimum reserve of Rs. 400 
Crores in foreign securities and a minimum of Rs. 115 crore in Gold 
coin and Gold bullions. But this was amended in 1957, prescribing 
that minimum reserve held in the issue department at any time should 
not be less than Rs. 200 crores of which the value of Gold should not 
be less than Rs. 115 crores. 
Another statutory function of the bank is to act as bankers, 
agent and advisor to the government. As bankers, the bank has been 
given a statutory obligation to accept monies for account of the 
central government and state government and to make payments upto 
the amount starting to their accounts respectively and to carry out 
their exchange remittances and other banking operations including 
the management of public debt. Besides, the Bank was designed to 
act as the financial advisor to the government so that it could mould 
the policy of the government itself in matters of financial 
transactions or in either direction. 
The Reserve Bank was designed to function as the crowning 
edifice of the financial structure of the country and other financial 
institutions belonging either to the call money market or short-term 
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money market and the capital market. It was armed with all the 
traditional weapons of credit control possessed by the Central Banks 
of other countries. To achieve the objective it makes extensive use of 
quantitative and qualitative techniques to control and regulate the 
credit effectively in the country. 
To maintain the stability in the external value of rupee, the 
bank got the statutory right to buy and sell the foreign currencies and 
protects the country's foreign exchange funds. 
1.6 Financial Sector Reforms: 
The guiding objectives of financial sector reforms are to 
improve financial sector efficiency while strengthening financial 
stability. It is a general believe that stable and efficient financial 
system provides the foundation for implementing effective 
stabilization policies, stepping up savings and improving the 
efficiency of investment, which help in achieving sustainable and 
higher rates of economic growth. The unprecedented balance of 
payment crisis and prolonged fiscal deficit forced the government to 
take corrective measures, and in this consonance a Committee on 
Financial Sector Reforms were constituted under the Chairmanship of 
Shri M. Narsimham, which submitted its report in 1991. Since then 
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various measures were initiated in all segments of financial markets 
aimed at improving depth and liquidity in the markets. The reforms 
also emphasized on improving the transparency and efficiency of the 
markets. The key reform measures undertaken in different market 
segments are presented below: 
Money M a r k e t : 
1. A ceiling of 10 percent on call money rates imposed by the 
Indian banks Association was withdrawn in 1989. 
2. Initially, the participation in the call market was gradually 
widened by including non-banks, such as, financial insti tutions, 
non-banking finance companies, primary/ satellite dealers, 
mutual funds, corporates (through primary dealers) , etc. the 
process of transformation of call money market to a pure inter-
bank market commenced effective May 2001. 
3. The 182-day treasury bills were introduced effective November 
1986, followed subsequently by phasing out of on-tap treasury 
bills, introduction of auctioning system in 91-day treasury bills 
since January 1983, and introduction of 14-day and 364-day 
treasury bills. The system of ad hoc treasury bills (with a fixed 
4.6 percent interest rate since July. 1974), which were issued by 
the Central Government to the Reserve bank, was abolished 
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effective April 1997. Currently only the 91-day and 364-day 
treasury bills exist. 
4. The Discount and Finance House of India (DFHI) was set up in 
April 1988, and was allowed to participate in the call/ notice 
money market both as a borrower and lender commencing from 
July 1988. 
5. Several new financial instruments were introduced, such as 
inter-bank participation certificates (1988), certificates of 
deposit (June 1989), commercial paper (January 1990) and repos 
(December 1992). 
6. Derivative products like forward rate agreements and interest 
rate swaps were introduced in July 1999 to enable banks, Fls and 
PDs to hedge interest rate risks. 
7. A full-fledged Liquidity Adjustment Facility was introduced on 
June 5, 2000 with a view to modulating short-term liquidity 
under diverse market conditions. 
8. With a view to adopting the sound risk management procedures 
and eliminating counter-party risk, the Clearing Corporation of 
India Ltd. was set up on February 15, 2002. The CCIL acts as a 
central counter-party to all trades involving foreign exchange, 
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government securities and other debt instruments routed through 
it and guarantees their settlement. 
9. The segment refinance facility for banks is gradually being 
phased out. 
Government Securities Market: 
1. New auction-based instruments were introduced with varying 
maturities such as 364-day, 182-day, 91-day and 14-day treasury 
bills and the zero coupon bond. The auction system was also 
introduced for Government of India dated securit ies. An 
innovative feature of 'part payment ' was added to the auction of 
Government of India dated securities. 
2. In the long-term segment, Floating Rate Bonds (FRBs) 
benchmarked to the 364-day Treasury bill yields and a 10-year 
loan with embedded call and put options exercisable on or after 
5 years from the date of issue were introduced. 
3. A system of Primary Dealers (PDs) was made operational in 
March 1996. 
4. Foreign Institutional Investors (FIIs) were allowed to set up 100 
percent debt funds to invest in Government (Central and State) 
dated securities in both primary and secondary markets. 
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5. The system of automatic monetisation of budget deficit through 
ad hoc treasury bills which hampered the development of the 
market was phased out over a period of three years from 1993-94 
to 1996-97 and was replace by the system of ways and Means 
Advances (WMA) with effect from April 1, 1997. 
6. The Delivery-versus-Payment system (DvP) was introduced in 
1995 for the settlement of transactions in Government securit ies. 
A screen-based trade reporting system with the use of VSAT 
communication network complemented by a centralized 
Subsidiary General Ledger (SGL) accounting system was put in 
place. 
7. The Negotiated Dealing System (NDS) (Phase-I) was 
operationalised in February 2002 to enable on-line electronic 
bidding facility in the primary auctions of Central/ State 
Government securities, OMO/ LAP auctions, screen-based 
electronic dealing and reporting of transactions in money market 
instruments, including repo and to facilitate information on 
trades with minimal time lag. 
8. Since timiely flow of information is a critical factor in evolving 
the efficient price discovery mechanism, improvements were 
brought in transparency of operations and data dissemination. 
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9. A practice of pre-announcing a calendar of treasury bills and 
government securities auctions to the market was introduced. 
10. Retail trading in Government securities at select stock 
exchanges commenced in January 2003. 
Foreign Exchange Market: 
1. The current account was gradually made convertible leading to 
the acceptance of obligations under Article VIII of the IMF. The 
exchange rate, which was pegged to a basket of currencies, was 
made market-determined in a phased manner. Several 
transactions in the capital account were also gradually 
liberalized over the years. 
2. In line with the liberal policy environments of the 1990s, the 
Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 (FERA), was replaced 
by the Foreign Exchange Management Act (FEMA) in 1999. 
3. Banks were given increased freedom for operating in the forex 
market. These related to the following: (a) freedom to fix 
overnight position limit and gap limits approved by RBI, 
replacing the system of across-the-board or RBI-prescribed 
limits; (b) freedom to initiate trading position in the overseas 
market; freedom to borrow (up to 25 per cent of Tier-I capital or 
up to US $ 250 million, whichever is higher) or freely invest 
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funds in the overseas market; (c) freedom to determine the 
interest rates (subject to a ceiling) and maturity period of 
Foreign Currency Non-Resident (FCNR) deposits (not exceeding 
three years); (d) freedom to use derivative products for asset-
liability management. 
4. Corporate were allowed to undertake active hedging operations 
by resorting to cancellation and rebooking of forward contracts, 
book forward contract based on past performance without having 
to produce documents endorsing a forex exposure, use foreign 
currency options and variations thereof like range forwards and 
ratio range forwards. They can access a range of products 
including Foreign Currency Rupee Swap to manage longer-term 
exposures arising out of External Commercial Borrowings. 
Capital Market: 
1. With the repeal of the Capital Issues (Control) Act, 1947, 
companies were given freedom to price their issues. The book-
building process in the new issue of capital was introduced with 
a view to further strengthen the price discovery process. 
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2. In the secondary market, the floor-based open outcry trading 
system was replaced by electronic trading system in all the stock 
exchanges. 
3. The account period settlement system was replaced by rolling 
settlement, thus, reducing the scope for speculation. The rolling 
settlement cycle was shortened from T+5 to T+3 with effect 
from April 1, 2002. This process was enabled by a shift to 
electronic book entry transfer system through depository 
mechanism. 
4. The risk management system was made more comprehensive 
with trading members being subject to margins based on trading 
volumes and some other parameters and exposure norms based 
on the capital deposited with the exchange. The mark-to-market 
margins based on 99 per cent value at risk were introduced to 
capture the risk profile of trading members. 
5. The Indian companies were allowed to raise funds from abroad, 
through American/ Global Depository Receipts (ADRs/ GDRs) 
foreign currency convertible bonds (FCCBs) and external 
commercial borrowings (ECBs). The Reserve Bank allowed two-
way fungibility of ADRs/ GDRs in February 2002. 
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6. Foreign institutional investors (FIIs) were allowed to participate 
in the capital market. 
7. For strengthening the process of information flows from the 
listed companies, several measures were introduced: (i) while 
sufficient disclosures are mandatory for the companies at the 
stage of public issue, the listed companies are also required 
under the listing agreement to make disclosures on a continuing 
basis; (ii) for ensuring quick flow of information to the public, 
the decision pertaining to dividend, bonus and right 
announcements or any material event are now required to be 
disclosed to the public within 15 minutes of the conclusion of 
the board meeting in which the decisions are taken; (iii) the 
accounting practices were streamlined with norms introduced for 
segment reporting, related party transactions and consolidated 
balance sheets. 
8. Insider trading was made a criminal offence. The regulations 
governing substantial acquisition of shares and takeovers of 
companies were also introduced aimed at protecting the interests 
of minority shareholders by making the takeover process more 
transparent. 
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9. For providing market participants instruments for Inedging and 
risk management, several types of derivative products on 
equities were introduced. Non-transparent products like 'badla' 
were banned. 
The analysis of cross-country experiences relating to financial 
sector reforms exhibit significant diversity, both overtime and across 
countries. Significant differences observed in respect of the content, 
pace and sequencing reforms. There was significant liberalization of 
the financial sector both in industrial and developing countries over 
the period 1973 - 2002. Interest rate controls were almost universally 
eliminated and barriers to entry for most non-bank financial 
institutions v^ere lowered, and in certain instances, rationalized. 
Asian countries like Japan, Korea, Malaysia and Indonesia followed a 
gradualist approach to financial liberalization in contrast to 
transition economies of Eastern Europe and some of the Latin 
American countries which adopted the 'big-bang' approach. The 
Table-1.2 shows the financial liberalization measures taken by 
different countries including India depicting the transition from 
controlled to market oriented measures. 
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TABT.E-T.2 
Financial Liberalisation in Select Countries: 1973-2002 
Country 
United States 
United 
Kingdom 
Korea 
Phillippines 
Thailand 
Argentina 
Brazil 
India 
Year 
1 
1973 
2002 
1973 
2002 
1973 
2002 
1973 
2002 
1973 
2002 
1973 
2002 
1973 
2002 
1973 
2002 
Credit 
controls 
2 
B:L; 
S& L:R 
L 
LL 
L 
R 
LL 
R 
PR 
R 
LL 
R 
LL 
R 
PR 
R 
LL 
Interest 
Rates 
3 
LL 
L 
B:LL 
L 
R 
LL 
R 
LL 
R 
L 
R 
LL 
R 
LL 
R 
LL 
Entry 
Barriers 
4 
PR 
LL 
B.LL 
L 
R 
B:PR 
NBF:LL 
R 
LL 
R 
LL 
R 
L 
R 
LL 
R 
PR 
Government 
Regulation of 
Operations 
5 
L 
L 
L 
L 
R 
PR 
PR 
PR 
-
-
-
-
-
-
R 
LL 
Privatisation 
6 
L 
L 
L 
L 
R 
LL 
PR 
LL 
PR 
LL 
R 
PR 
PR 
PR 
R 
PR 
L: Liberalised: A liberalized system is one where the role of the Government has 
been largely curtailed. 
LL; Largely liberalized: Largely liberalized denotes a system governed more by 
market forces, with Government role in certain important spheres. 
R: Repressed: A repressed system is one in which virtually all decisions in the 
relevant dimension are made by the Government. 
PR: Partly repressed: A partly repressed system is one where repression is not 
complete, but the system is closer to that end of the spectrum. 
B: Banks: NBFls: Non-banking financial institutions; S & L: Saving and Loan 
Associations. 
Source: The position on 1973 is from Williamson and Mahar (1998) and position 
for 2002 is compiled from the websites of different Central Banks. 
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1.7 Conclusion: 
To conclude, due to financial liberalization and globalisation, 
the relationship between money, output and prices has turned 
increasingly volatile and unpredictable. The price stability has 
become the dominant objective of almost all Central Banks in the 
world. The uncertain transmission channels have posed a 
considerable challenge for the conduct of monetary policy and 
accordingly, different Central Banks have abandoned monetary 
targeting and experimented with interest rates, exchange rate etc., 
which could provide a fix on inflation. Thus with the rising volumes 
of cross-border transactions and the growing interdependence across 
countries, more need of coordination in policy actions and higher 
degree of openness on the choice of monetary policy strategy are 
required by the Central Banks of different countries. 
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Gnapier-^Z 
1=: 
GENERAL INSTRUMENTS OF MONETARY MANAGEMENT 
2.1 Introduction: 
Credit is an important part of monetary management. It plays a 
predominant role in the settlement of monetary and business 
transactions of all kinds, and thus represents a powerful force for 
good or eviJ. It is thus universally accepted that the creation and 
distribution of credit, under the existing intricate economic 
organization, should be subjected to some form of regulation and 
control. 
The regulation of credit is accepted generally as the main 
function of a Central Bank. "It is the function", observes a 
celebrated writer on Central Banking, "which embraces the most 
important questions of Central Banking policy and the one through 
which practically all other functions are united and made to serve a 
common purpose ". Credit control is the principal means by which a 
Central Bank fulfils the three objectives of monetary policy: 
exchange stabilization, price stabilization and economic stabilization. 
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The primary methods available with the Central Bank for 
regulation or adjustment of credit are: 
(i) The lowering or raising of its discount rate (bank rate) with a 
view to lowering or raising money rates generally and encouraging 
the expansion or contraction of credit, i.e. regulation of the size and 
flow of credit through changes in the bank rate. 
(ii) Open market operations in securities, investments and bills, i.e. 
the buying and selling of securities or bills of exchange in the open 
market with a view of putting additional funds into the market or 
withdrawing funds from there and thus expanding or contracting 
credit. 
(iii) Varying the reserve requirements of the banking system, i.e. 
the lowering or raising of minimum reserves to be kept by the 
commercial banks in the form of credit balances with the Central 
Bank to expand or contract the credit creating capacity of the 
commercial banks. 
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2.2 Loans and Rediscount Policy of the Reserve Bank: 
The significance of rediscount policy lies in the fact that it 
increases the elasticity and liquidity of the entire credit structure. By 
affording rediscounting facilities, the Central Bank provides the 
member banks with additional or alternative means for the 
conversion of certain of their earning assets into cash, when their 
cash reserves are adversely affected and tend to fall below the 
statutory or traditional minimum, or when they find it necessary or 
desirable to increase their cash reserves for one or other purposes. 
The foundations of the credit organization, on which the policy of 
monetary management vitally depends, can not be solid unless the 
Central Bank supplies adequate rediscounting facilities, which alone 
enable the other banks to convert into cash a maximum of their assets 
with a minimum of disturbance in the conditions of the money 
market. Without rediscounting facilities the most legitimate assets of 
the banks in the shape of short time advances against goods 
represented by commercial bills cannot become quick assets readily 
convertible into cash in an emergency. In fact the success and 
effectiveness of rediscount policy presupposes three major 
components: 
(i) The development of local money market 
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(ii) The dependence of the commercial banks upon the Central Bank 
for rediscounting and their inter dependence 
(iii) The degree of cooperation between the Central Bank and other 
banking institutions. 
2.2.1 Rediscounting Powers of the Reserve Bank: 
Even before the Reserve Bank was actually delivered by its 
framers, it was conceived by Hilton-Young Commission as 'the 
regulator of currency and credit' in the country. Later, the Central 
Banking Enquiry Committee in 1931 expressed their hope that "the 
establishment of such a bank would, by mobilization of the banking 
and currency reserves of India in one hand, tend to increase the 
volume of credit available for trade, industry and agriculture and to 
mitigate the evils of fluctuating and high charges for the use of such 
credit caused by seasonal stringency"'. With such pious hopes and 
aspirations, it was but natural that the Reserve Bank should have 
been constituted by its framers "to regulate the issue of Bank Notes 
and the keeping of reserves with a view to securing monetary 
stability in India adequately to operate the currency and credit 
system of the country, to its advantage" . To meet this gracious 
objective in the most expedient manner, the Bank was vested with 
statutory powers to buy and rediscount eligible commercial paper, to 
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extend loans and advances against the security of eligible documents, 
to purchase and sell government securities, to maintain the cash 
reserves of the eligible banks and to publish from time to time its 
bank rate, at which it is prepared to buy or rediscount bills of 
exchange or other eligible commercial paper. 
The Reserve Bank of India Act, while giving the Bank such 
powers, has defined the 'eligible paper', which the Bank can accept 
for rediscount. These are: (i) bills drawn on and payable in India, 
arising out of bonafide commercial or trade transaction and bearing 
the prior endorsement of either a scheduled bank or a state 
Cooperative Bank, (ii) bills drawn and payable in India for purposes 
of financing seasonal agricultural operations or the marketing crops, 
endorsed by either a scheduled bank or a state cooperative bank 
(iii) bills drav/n and payable in India for the purpose of financing the 
production or marketing activities of cottage and small scale 
industries approved by Bank and supported by either a state 
Cooperative Bank or a Stale Financial Corporation and guaranteed by 
the State government (iv) bills drawn and payable in India for the 
purpose of holding or trading in government securit ies, (v) bills 
(including Treasury Bills) drawn in any place in any country outside 
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India, which is a member of the International Monetary Fund (I.M.F.) 
and endorsed by a scheduled bank. 
Consistent with the technique of Central Banking, the Reserve 
Bank is authorized to publish from time to time its Bank Rate - the 
standard rate at which it is prepared to buy or rediscount bills of 
exchange or other commercial paper eligible for purchase or 
rediscount. The Bank has also an explicit power to engage in open 
market operations involving purchase and sale of Central government 
securities or state government securities of any maturity and of such 
securities of local authorities as may be specified in this behalf by 
the Central government. 
Besides, these powers, the Reserve Bank Act provided for an 
'escape clause ' by which the bank could, if a special occasion arose 
for regulating credit in the interest of Indian trade, commerce, 
industry and agriculture, resort to direct discounts and direct loans 
without the mediation of a scheduled or a state cooperative bank. 
The Reserve Bank of India provides credit to banks in two 
forms: (a) as advances against eligible securities, such as government 
securities and 'other approved securities' and (b) as rediscounts of 
eligible usance bills under its Bills Rediscounting Scheme of 
November 1970. Credit is provided to banks partly in fulfillment of 
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the traditional Central Banking functions and partly for promoting 
certain new policy objectives. The Reserve Bank of India also uses 
its lending power to banks (a) to influence their credit allocation and 
(b) to develop a genuine bill market in India. It does the former 
under its refinance facilities to banks and the latter under its Bills 
rediscounting scheme, and both at concessional rates of interest. 
The Bank Rate principle is divided into two: 
(i) Operation of the bank rate as a weapon of control of money 
supply - according to it, an increase in the bank rate by raising the 
cost of borrowed reserves, other things being the same, discourages 
bank borrowings from the Central Bank. The reverse is supposed to 
happen when the bank rate is lowered. This varies the rate of 
expansion of High-powered Money (H) and so of Broad Money (M3), 
assuming the money multiplier to remain unchanged. But the success 
of this effect will depend on several factors such as (a) the degree of 
banks dependence on borrowed reserves, (b) the sensitivity of banks 
demand for borrowed reserves to the differential between their 
lending rates and borrowing rates, (c) the extent to which the other 
rates of interest have already changed or change subsequently, and 
(d) the state of the demand for loans and the supply of funds from 
other sources, etc. 
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(ii) The other part of the bank rate theory relates to the effect of 
the bank rate changes on the domestic level and structure of interest 
takes and thereby on the level of economic activity and the balance 
of payments of the country. An increase in the bank rate is supposed 
to be followed by a rise in the market rates of interest all along the 
line - more so and rapidly on the end than on the short end than on 
the long end of the interest rate spectrum. This happens because the 
lending rates of banks are likely to be revised upward, partly to 
absorb the higher cost of borrowed reserves and partly to take in the 
stock in their lending rates which, being sticky, might have become 
too low than what the market could pay and because banks ' supply of 
credit tends to be reduced consequent on their reduced borrowing 
from the Central Bank. The 'announcement effect' of changes in the 
bank rate is supposed to hasten the spread process, as the market has 
come to interpret an increase in the bank rate as the official signal 
for the onset of a period of relatively dearer as well as tighter money, 
and the reverse in the case of a reduction in the bank rate. 
2.2.2 Loans and Discounting Operations of the Bank: 
The application of monetary policy instruments has witnessed 
distinct qualitative change overtime. Though the instruments 
available at the disposal of the Reserve Bank remained more or less 
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unchanged through out the period, their relative efficacy and the 
environment in which they have been applied have undergone a sea 
change, particularly during the nineties. 
During the pre-independence period of the instruments, the 
Bank rate was particularly important since it was the signaling rate 
and the Reserve Bank used to provide accommodation uniformly at 
the Bank rate except its Ways and Means Advances to the Central 
and Provincial governments at one percent less than the Bank rate. 
During early 1950s when monetisation was becoming high 
consequent upon passive buying of the government securities by the 
Reserve Bank from commercial banks, which the latter had 
accumulated during the period, the Reserve Bank required 
commercial banks to borrow from it against the government and other 
approved securities at the Bank rate. However, the effectiveness of 
the Bank rate dwindled sharply with the emergence of differential 
interest rates system initially in the form of a quota-cum-slab system 
in October 1960 followed by a similar but more stringent system 
based on net liquidity position of borrowing banks in September 1964 
as also the absence of genuine bill market. In the post nationalization 
phase, with increased emphasis being bestowed on priority sector 
lending and consessional lending, the Bank rate lost much of its 
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significance till the announcement of resurrecting it was made in 
April 1997. The Bank rate was changed nine times during 1951 - 74 
and only thrice during the period 1975 - 96 despite the substantial 
growth of the financial sector and the pressures on liquidity exerted 
at different points of time over the 45 years between 1951 to 1996 
and from 1997 to onwards the Bank rate is continuously on decline 
with the exception of January 17, 1988 and July 2000. 
Table-2.1: Use of the Bank Rate 
(Per cent) 
Decade 
1950s 
1960s 
1970s 
1980s 
1990s 
April 2000 - Feb 2003 
Bank rate 
Number of 
times changed 
1 
2 
4 
3 
1 
10 
6 
Range 
2 
3.0-4.0 
4.0-6.0 
5.0-9.0 
9.0-10.0 
8.0-12.0 
6.25-8.0 
Inflation Rate 
Average 
3 
1.7 
6.4 
9.0 
8.0 
8.1 
4.6 
Range 
4 
(-) 12.5-14.0 
(-) 1.2-13.9 
(-) 1.1-25.2 
4.4-18.2 
3.3-13.7 
3.0-7.2 
Source: Report on Currency & Finance, RBI (2003) 
The above table 2.1 shows the decade-wise changes in the bank 
rate and the average inflation rate and the table 2.2 summarises the 
bank rate changes from 1935 to 2003 and the chart 2.1 depicts the 
bank rate changes after the liberalization i.e., from 1991 to 2003. 
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TABLE-2.2 
Changes in Bank Rate 
(Percent) 
S. No. 
1. 
2. 
J . 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
Date 
July 04, 1935 
November 28, 1935 
November 15, 1951 
May 16, 1957 
January 03, 1963 
September 26, 1964 
February, 17, 1965 
March 02, 1968 
January 09, 1971 
May 31, 1974 
July 23, 1974 
July 12, 1981 
July 04, 1991 
October 09, 1991 
April 16, 1997 
June 26, 1997 
October 22, 1997 
January 17. 1998 
March 19, 1998 
Bank Rate 
3.5 
3.0 
3.5 
4.0 
4.5 
5.0 
6.0 
5.0 
6.0 
7.0 
9.0 
10.0 
11.0 
12.0 
11.0 
10.0 
9 
11 
10.5 
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20. Aprils, 1998 
21. 1 April 29, 1998 
22. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
26. 
27. 
28. 
29. 
30. 
31. 
32. 
March 2, 1999 
May 1999 
January 05, 2000 
April 2, 2000 
July 2000 
February 2001 
March 23, 2001 
October 22, 2001 
January 04, 2002 
October 29, 2002 
October 29, 2003 
10 
9 
8 
8 
8 
7 
8 
7.5 
7 
6.5 
6.5 
6.25 
6.0 
Source: RBI Occasional Papers Vol.18 Nos. 2 & 3 special issue (June 
& September), 1997 and RBI Annual Report, 1998 to 2004. 
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As regards interest rate policy, the Reserve Bank derives its 
authority to regulate the interest rate of banks under sections 21 and 
35A of the Banking Regulation Act. In consonance with the statute, it 
prescribed lending rates with a view to influencing the demand for 
credit and imparting an element of discipline in the use of credit. 
This was sought to be achieved by stipulating minimum lending rates 
introduced in October 1960, and occasionally by clamping ceiling 
rates for either dampening credit growth exercised in September 1964 
or protecting a certain economic activity/ borrowers e.g. on exports 
credit stipulated in March 1968. With regard to deposit rates, prior to 
September 1964, these were governed by a voluntary agreement 
amongst the most important Indian and foreign banks fixing ceilings 
on interest rates on deposit barring for a short period during 
September 1960 - February 1961 when the Reserve Bank stipulated 
the interest rates for periods upto 14 days. However, regulations of 
deposit rates came into being from September 1964. Effective from 
September 1969, the Reserve Bank prohibited interest payment on 
current accounts and on deposits upto 14 days. Subsequently, 
particularly since 1970s, coupled with the increasing proliferation of 
directed credit arrangements, multiple interest rate prescriptions 
based on variety of criteria such as economic activity, commodity. 
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location, specific group of borrower etc., and the resultant cross 
subsidization created a very complex administered interest rate 
structure with virtually no role for market forces to play in pricing 
and allocation of credit. A major reform was initiated with a view to 
simplifying the complex lending rate structure effective September 
22, 1990: "The structure was characterized by a multiplicity of rates 
with concessionality in the interest rate dependent on numerous 
criteria such as, size of loan, priority nature of a sector, location of 
activity, programme specific lending, income of borrowers, and so 
on. 
2.2.3 Post-Liberalisation Phase: 
The unprecedented balance of payments crisis during the 
summer of 1991 emanating from high and prolonged fiscal and 
balance of payments deficits prompted the government to take a 
number of policy measures. These policies of financial stabilization 
and structural adjustment helped the economy to quickly recover and 
facilitate integration of the Indian economy with the world economy. 
In the financial sector, reforms were initiated following the 
recommendation of the committee on the financial system under the 
chairmanship of Shri. M. Narsimham, which submitted its report in 
1991. The reform measures addressed a number of issues such as: 
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(i) Improving the external constraints having a bearing on the 
profitability of the banks, 
(ii) Strengthening banks and financial institutions through 
application of prudential norms, and 
(iii) Improving the competitiveness of banks and financial 
institutions. 
The transition from a planned economy to a market economy in 
the 1990s, sharpened the Reserve Bank's monetary management 
dilemma of providing credit to both the government and the 
commercial sector at a reasonable cost, while at the same time 
containing inflationary pressures. While sudden external shocks 
required a hardening of monetary conditions in order to ensure 
orderly conditions in the financial markets, the growth objective 
presaged a softer interest rate regime. In view of the increasing 
complexities of monetary management, the Reserve Bank adopted a 
multiple indicator approach in which a host of macroeconomic 
variables are monitored for the process of monetary policy 
formulation. Furthermore, the monitory authority had to 
simultaneously hone up an array of monetary policy instruments — 
quantum and rate-in order to harness monetary conditions to the 
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desired macroeconomic objectives in this environment of 
uncertainties. 
2.2.4 Intermediate Target: 
The Reserve Bank broadly followed a monetary targeting 
regime since the later half of the 1980s till 1997-98, based on the 
recommendations of the Chakravarty Committee. The cornerstone of 
the monetary strategy was a stable relationship between money, 
output and prices. The a\ai lable empirical evidence then had clearly 
suggested that the demand for real money was a reasonably stable 
function of a select set of variables. In fact, some of the factors that 
have contributed to the instability of the demand function for money 
in the industrial economies such as financial innovations and large 
movements of funds across the border were yet to have the same 
impact in India. The Reserve Bank was, thus, able to estimate the 
appropriate growth in money supply, given the expected increase in 
real output and the acceptable level of inflation. An increase in 
money supply was seen not only resulting in an increase in demand 
but also influencing output through the availability of credit . The 
concept of monetary targeting that was being used in India was a 
flexible one, which accounts the various feedbacks. In this 
connection, Governor Rangarajan had remarked that "our approach 
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to money supply has been electic. We have not bound by a fixed rate 
of growth of money. This is a far cry from 'mindless monetarism ' of 
which we are sometimes accused. 
T\\Q growing complexities of monetary management during the 
1990s increasingly required that the formulation of monetary policy 
be based on the information gleaned from a large number of 
macroeconomic indicators rather than being predicated on a single 
monetary aggregate. 
In the new monetary management framework, although the 
exclusive use of monetary aggregates has been de-emphasised, it 
reiriains an important indicator of the monetary policy stance, with 
the monetary and credit policy statements announcing monetary 
projections for the year. Monetary aggregates continue to be relevant 
for India for two reasons. First since the money demand function for 
India has remained reasonably stable, it remains helpful in predicting 
price movements with reasonable accuracy at least over a period of 
t ime, say 3 to 5 years. Secondly, the money stock target is relatively 
well understood by the public at large. With the money supply target, 
the stance of monetary policy is unambiguously defined and gives a 
clear signal to market participants. 
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2.2.5 Changes in operating procedures of monetary policy: 
The operating procedures of monetary policy have been 
changing the world over in response to financial liberalization. The 
key challenge before the contemporary monetary management is to 
modulate liquidity conditions in the financial markets consistent not 
only with the macroeconomic objectives but also with the market 
outcomes. 
The operating procedures of monetary policy of most Central 
Banks are now beginning to converge to variants of three closely 
related paradigms. 
(a) Need for a market-oriented policy mix of open market operations 
and interest rate signals consistent with the process of price 
discovery. 
(b) Need to sterilise capital flows following the opening up of the 
economy. 
(c) Need for swift policy reactions to maintain orderly conditions in 
the financial markets. 
The operating procedure of the conduct of the Reserve Bank's 
monetary policy have witnessed, in many ways, the most dramatic 
shifts during the 1990s. The Reserve Bank has gradually shifted from 
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direct to indirect instruments of monetary management in order to 
align monetary policy to the new market based environment. The 
emerging liquidity management framework is broadly in line with 
cross-country experiences in respect of changes in operating 
procedures of monetary policy in response to the challenges of 
financial liberalization. There are now an array of monetary policy 
levers, including open market operations and interest ratio signals -
which are able to effectively modulate monetary conditions 
consistent with the process of price discovery. Besides, the shifts in 
the monetary policy transmission channels as a result of financial 
liberalization necessitate policy impulses through both quantum and 
rate channels. Finally, the experience of sudden switches in capital 
flows has emphasized the need for swift policy reactions with a view 
to balancing the domestic and external sources of monetisation to 
maintain orderly conditions in the financial market ensure price 
stability. 
With the gradual liberalization of interest rates by the mid -
1090s, the Reserve Bank was able to reactivate the Bank Rate as a 
signaling device in 1997 - 1998. The role of the Bank Rate has been 
changing over the years with the deepening of financial sector 
reforms. It was initially used as a single lever to change financial 
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prices, with the entire liquidity support from the Reserve Bank, and 
for a time before full liberalization, commercial bank deposit rates 
were linked to it. As the price of the bulk of primary liquidity is 
now, more or less, market determined, the Bank Rate now essentially 
acts as a signal of the Reserve Bank 's medium-term monetary policy 
stance. A number of rates, such as the interest payable on eligible 
CRR balances, and the interest charged on Ways And Means 
Advances to the Government and a portion of export credit refinance, 
continue to be at the Bank Rate. 
The deregulation of interest rates was Central to the new 
market-oriented monetary strategy in terms of rejuvenating the price 
discovery process, on the one hand and in terms of developing an 
interest rate channel of monetary transmission on the other. The first 
step in this direction was taken in September 1991 with the 
discontinuation of Sector-specific and Programme specific 
prescript ions excepting for a few areas like agriculture and small 
industr ies, the Differential Rate of Interest (DRI) scheme and export 
credit. The process of deregulation was carried forward with the 
withdrawal of the minimum lending rate in October 1994. therebv 
providing banks full freedom to determine lending rates for loans 
above Rs. 2 lakhs. Banks were only required to announce their Prime 
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Lending Rates (PLR), subsequently in October 1996, in view of high 
spreads over the PLR and to impart a degree of transparency, banks 
were advised to announce the maximum spread over the PLR. Banks 
were later permitted to operate different PLRs for different 
maturit ies and lend at sub-PLR to creditworthy borrowers. 
The process of deregulation for Deposit rate began in April 
1992 by replacing the existing maturity-wise prescription by a single 
ceiling rate, which was subsequently varied in line with the 
modifications in the minimum lending rate and evolving macro-
economic developments followed by complete deregulation in 
October 1997. At present, the only domestic deposit rate that 
continues to be prescribed in the saving deposit rate fixed at 3.5%. 
The deposit rates in respect of non-resident rupee deposits were also 
deregulated on broadly similar lines while that on foreign currency 
deposits are subject to a ceiling rate linked to London Inter-bank 
Offer Rate (LIBOR). All these changes are summarised in the 
table-2 .3 . 
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TABLE 2.3 
Interest Rates on Domestic Term Deposits: Deregulation 
Month 
April 1992 
November 1994 
April 1995 
October 1995 
July 1996 
April 1997 
October 1997 
April 1998 
Measure 
The existing maturity-wise prescription replaced 
by a single ceiling rate of 13 percent for all 
deposits above 46 days of maturity 
To ceiling rate brought down to 10.0 percent. 
The ceiling rate raised to 12.0 percent. 
Deposits of maturity of over two years exempted ' 
from the ceiling. 
Deposits of maturity of over one year exempted 
from the ceiling. 
The ceiling rate for deposits of '30 days up to one 
year' linked to the Bank Rate less 200 basis 
points. 
Deposit rates fully deregulated by removing the 
linkage to the Bank Rate. 
Banks allowed to offer differential rates of interest 
depending upon the size of the deposit. 
Source: Report on Currency & Finance, RBI (2003) 
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2.3 Open Market Operations - A Technique of Monetary 
Management: 
Open market operations relate to the dealings of the Central 
Bank directly with the market on its own initiatives with a view to 
effecting necessary variations in the supply of money. These dealings 
consist of a deliberate and direct purchase or sale by the Central 
Bank of its assets - bills, securities, bonds, Gold, Silver and foreign 
exchange generally. But dealings in government and other gilt -
edged securities, both long term and short term have been undertaken 
by various Central Banks in such huge amounts and so frequently 
that open market operations have, by practice, come to confined to 
those referring to government securities only. However, a purchase 
or sale of assets, may be of government securities only by the Central 
Bank constitutes a direct method of aiming at the desired expansion 
or contraction of money and credit and of general economic activity. 
This is done in two ways. In the first place, purchases and sales of 
securities by the Central Bank tend directly and immediately to 
increase or decrease the quantity of money in circulation and the 
cash reserves of the commercial banks. This increase or decrease in 
the supply of bank cash, on which depends the credit creating 
capacity of the commercial banks tends still further to increase or 
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decrease the quantity of money thereby bringing about relative 
changes in the money rates and credit conditions. Secondly, a 
purchase or sale of securities by the Central Bank affects, to some 
extent, the prices of government securities and, therefore, influences 
the long-term rates of interest. Through both these devices the 
Central Monetary Authority is able to introduce the desired 
adjustments in the domestic levels of prices, costs, production, trade 
and employment. The policy of rediscounting brings about an indirect 
influence on money and credit through primary changes in short-term 
money rates and secondary repercussions on long-term interest rates 
or yields, where as open market policy of the Central Bank has a 
direct and immediate effect on the volume of money and credit as 
well as on money and interest rates. 
The open market operations possess a degree of superiority 
over rediscount policy because of the fact that the initiatixe is in the 
hands of the monetary authority, whereas Bank Rate is passive 
because its effectiveness depends upon the response of the 
commercial banks and their customers. In fact the open market policv 
has two doors, one through which to enter and another one by which 
to get out again. But the open market operations are by no means 
intended to do entirely away with the Bank Rate policy, but rather a 
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useful and indispensable complement of each other. Open market 
operations may be used to make the bank rate effective or to prepare 
the ground for a change in bank rate; to support government credit or 
to prepare the market in connection with the issue of new loans or 
the conversion of existing loans; to create and maintain conditions of 
cheap money as an aid to business recovery; to effect the movements 
in the balance of payments; to offset seasonal movements in the 
economy and thus to control the money market generally. Thus open 
market policy of the Central Bank is an important technique of 
monetary management. 
2.3.1 Statutory Power of the Reserve Bank 'To Operate' in the Market: 
The nature and the quality of the assets in which the Reserve 
Bank of India could operate are originally defined in section 17 of 
the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934. There are two principal ways 
assigned to the Reserve Bank to influence the money markets directly 
by its operations. The first is the traditional form of the purchase and 
sale of bills of exchange, promissory notes, treasury bills and 
government securities. Sections 17 (2) and 17 (3) of the Act 
authorizes the Bank "to purchase and sell bills and promissory notes 
arising out of bonafide commercial or trade transactions or for the 
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purpose of seasonal operations". The bank is also authorized to 
purchase and sell bills of exchange and Treasury bills of any foreign 
country, which may be a member of the International Monetary Fund. 
To second instrument of operation in the open market policy of 
the Reserve Eiank is provided by section 17(12) of the Reserve Bank 
of India Act, whereby the bank is authorized to purchase and sell 
Gold coin and bullion and foreign exchange. Open market operations 
in these assets has potentially unlimited scope provided they are 
available in the market. 
2.3.2 Pre-Liberalisation Phase: 
When the Reserve Bank of India was inaugurated in April 1935, 
it had, in its banking department, the government securities to the 
value of Rs. 5 crores which the government of India had contributed 
towards the reserve fund of the bank. Soon after its inauguration, the 
money market was caught into stringency and the Reserve Bank, 
entered the market and purchased the securities to ease the situation. 
Thus the open market operation is being used (upto 1970s) as an 
instrument of monetary control right from the beginning. But for this 
instrument to be successful at least three conditions must be 
satisfied : (i) the market for government securities should be well 
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organized and developed, that is broad, deep and resilient (ii) the 
Central Bank should have enough capacity to buy and sell securities 
and (iii) the Central Bank in its conduct of these operations should 
not be weighed down by weightier consideration than monetary 
control. Of these, only condition (ii) is well satisfied and the other 
two conditions are not well satisfied. The Indian gilt-edged market is 
not well developed. The Treasury Bill Market representing the short 
end of (he market is practically under developed - it is limited 
largely to the RBI itself and scheduled commercial banks. The 
market for government bonds, on the demand side is largely a captive 
market, comprising mainly financial institutions such as commercial 
banks, the Life Insurance Corporation (LIC) the General Insurance 
Corporation (GIC) and subsidiaries and provident fund. These 
institutions are required by law to invest a certain minimum 
proportion of their total liabilities in government securities and 
certain 'other approved securities'. On the supply side, the RBI is 
the main reservoir of government securities and enjoys a near-
monopolist position. The other reason for the relative unimportance 
of open market operations as an instrument of a monetary control is 
that they are weighed heavily by considerations of public-debt 
management. The RBI's prime objective has been to use these 
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operations to assist the government in its ever-growing borrowing 
programmes by maintaining orderly conditions in the gilt edged 
market and to keep the interest cost of debt to the government as low 
as possible. 
Though the open market operation along with the other 
instruments used continuously but its relative efficacy decreased 
continuously due to the under development of the money market. In 
1950s, bank rate was more effective but with the emergence of 
differential interest rates system the effectiveness of the bank rate 
dwindled sharply and gradually the CRR and SLR became the active 
policy instruments. With the weakening fiscal position of the Central 
government, the resources of the banking sector increasingly 
absorbed to support the market-borrowing programme of the 
government on longer-term basis at highly concessional rates of 
interest through prescriptions of higher statutory liquidity ratio. As 
the resources thus garnered often fell short of financing of the fiscal 
deficit, the Central government took recourse to the Reserve Bank 
through issue of ad hoc treasury bills at relatively low rates of 
interest. These and other statutory liabilities not only 'crowded out" 
the private sector, the government securities market which had been 
once vibrant with wider participations, lost its depth as the rates of 
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interest and maturity period of securities reflected essentially the 
perceptions of the issuer i.e. the government rather than those of the 
market and investors. As a result, open market operations were 
rendered ineffective. Since 1970s, the increasing proliferation of 
directed credit arrangements, multiple interest rate prescriptions 
based on variety of criteria such as economic activity, commodity, 
location, specific group of borrower etc., and the resultant cross 
subsidization created a very complex administered interest rate 
structure with virtually no role for market forces to play in pricing 
and allocation of credit. Thus during 1980s open market operations 
were not used as an active instrument of monetary management. 
2.3.3 Post-Liberalisation Phase: 
As the functioning of the monetary system in India had not 
been the subject of comprehensive review, the Reserve Bank of India 
appointed a committee in December 1982 under the chairmanship of 
Professor Sukhmoy Chakarvarty to review the working of the 
monetary system and suggest measures for improving the 
effectiveness of monetary policy as an instrument for promoting the 
basic objectives of planned economic development. The committee 
submitted its report in April 1985, which formed the basis for the 
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changes in monetary policy. A Working Group on the Money Market 
under the chairmanship of Shri N. Vaghul was formed to examine 
certain recommendations of the Chakarvarty Committee relating to 
the development of the money market. The Working Group submitted 
its report in January 1987, following which several money market 
measures were undertaken in the late 1980s. The 182-day Treasury 
Bill was introduced on an auction basis. The Discount and Finance 
House of India (DFHI) was set up to promote a secondary market in 
various money market instruments. From May 1, 1989 all interest 
rate ceilings on money market instruments were withdrawn. In order 
to encourage the use of commercial bills and short-term liquidity in 
the banking system, inter-bank participation certificates, certificates 
of deposit (CD) and commercial paper (CP) were introduced. Interest 
rates on CDs and CPs, were left to be determined by the market. 
Though the reform were initiated in late 1980s, but the 
unprecedented balance of payments crisis during 1991 and prolonged 
fiscal deficits prompted the government to take a number of policy 
measures. The Committee on the Financial Sector Reforms 
(Chairman: Shri M. Narsimham) which addressed a number of issues 
such as (i) improving the external constraints having a bearing on 
the profitability of the banks (ii) strengthening banks and financial 
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institutions through application of prudential norms, and (iii) 
improving the competitiveness of banks and financial institutions, 
submitted its report in 1991. In consonance with the 
recommendations, number of changes were brought in different areas. 
But the most significant change was brought in the area of 
Government Securities market. Concomitant with the sharp fiscal 
adjustment of the Central government, the interest rates on 
government paper have been made market related and the maturity 
periods reduced substantially to a maximum of 10 years. A 
Supplemental Agreement has also been reached between the 
Government and the Reserve Bank, first in September 1994 followed 
by the one in March 1997 relating to automatic monetisation of fiscal 
deficit. As a result, ad hoc and Tap Treasury Bills were completely 
phased out, effective April 1, 1997. Apart from these, six well-
capitalized Primary Dealers (PDs) for dealing in government 
securities were instituted, the Delivery versus Payment (DvP) was 
introduced for Government securities in July 1995, new techniques of 
floatation and introduction of new instrument were adopted to impart 
greater transparency in operations. Repos, on all Central government 
dated securities and Treasury bills of all maturities were allowed 
from April 1997. In order to enhance the depth of the market, the 
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Reserve Bank also issued guidelines for institution of Satellite 
Dealers (SDs) in December 1996. All these measures have brought 
about significant changes and developed a new treasury culture 
amongst banks and institutions, which forced the Reserve Bank of 
India to switch over from direct instruments of monetary management 
to indirect instruments. In fact the operating procedure of monetary 
management that changed dramatically in the 1990s were driven by 
three inter-related factors. 
(i) Need for a market-oriented policy mix of open market 
operations and interest rate signals consistent with the process 
of price discovery. 
(ii) Need to sterilize capital flows following the opening up of the 
economy. 
(iii) Need for swift policy reactions to maintain orderly conditions 
in the financial markets. 
Finally, the Reserve Bank of India reactivated open market 
(including repo) operations in an attempt to move from direct to 
indirect instruments of monetary management in 1992-93. Since the 
early 1990s, the monetary targeting approach in the conduct of 
monetary policy came under stress with increasing interplay of 
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market forces in the determination of interest rates and exciiange rate 
as a consequence of deregulation. The excess liquidity engendered by 
capital flows imparted an upward pressure on money supply. The 
Third Working Group on Money Supply (Chairman: Dr. Y.V. Reddy), 
which submitted its Report in June 1998, found that the output 
response to monetary policy operating through the interest rate 
channel tends to be stronger and more persistent than that through 
the credit channel. With pricing decisions left increasingly to market 
forces, the interest rate and exchange rate gained in importance vis-
a-vis quantity variable. Accordingly, RBI gradually switched over to 
a more broad-based multiple indicator approach and an Interim 
Liquidity Adjustment Facility (ILAF) was introduced initially in 
April 1999. This later transited into a full fledged LAP, put in place 
on June 5, 2000. Thus, the monetary management in the system is 
carried out through open market operations in the form of outright 
purchases/ sales of government securities and repo and reverse repo 
operations under Liquidity Adjustment Facility (LAF). The LAF 
enables the Reserve Bank to modulate short-term liquidity under 
varied financial market conditions in order to ensure stable 
conditions in the overnight (Call) money market. It operates through 
daily repo and reverse repo auctions thereby setting a corridor for the 
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short-term interest rate consistent with policy objectives. Although 
there is no formal targeting of overnight interest rates, LAF 
operation has enabled the Reserve Bank to de-emphasize the 
targeting of bank reserves and focus increasingly on interest rates. At 
present, there is a multiplicity of rates at which liquidity is absorbed/ 
injected. In an interest rate corridor framework, with the system 
being in surplus mode, it is generally witnessed that there are 
normally two rates through which liquidity is absorbed and one rate 
through which liquidity is injected, and vice-versa when the system 
is in deficit mode. Since the repo rate has emerged as the policy-
signaling rate, its relative position within the corridor becomes 
important. The cross-country experiences show that policy signaling 
rate is placed in the middle of the corridor. However, in the present 
framework, the repo rate has been acting as both the policy rate as 
well as the rate for passive sterilization of excess liquidity emanating 
from capital flows. The chart 2.2 clearly depicts the above 
explanations. 
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As the repo rate provides the floor for call rates, it has created 
some infirmities in the system. The RBI's LAP repo operations have 
the tendency to substitute market activities in call/ notice money, 
term money and market repo operations. Banks may have less 
incentive to lend fully in call/ notice market in a scenario of narrow 
spread between call rate and repo rate. After taking into account 
relative credit risk, bank may prefer to lend even at a marginally 
lower rate by repoing with RBI than lending in call. This combined 
with substantial improvement in liquidity has caused call/ notice 
money turnover to shrink from Rs. 35,144 crore during 2001-02 to 
Rs. 19,920 crore during April - October 2003. The average amount of 
repo outstanding with RBI (taking into account both one day and 14-
day repo) has increased from Rs. 3,503 crore during 2001-02 to Rs. 
11,196 crore during 2002-03 and further to Rs. 29,290 crore during 
April - October 2003. The repo amount has witnessed marked upturn 
particularly from April 2003 onwards following call rates falling 
below the repo rate, as shown in the table-2.4 
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In order to address the problem of excess liquidity engendered 
by the surge in capital inflows, the Reserve Bank undertook large-
scale open market operation. This helped absorption of excess 
liquidity by outright sales of Government of India rupee securities 
from its portfolio of Rs. 9,047 crore during 1993-94. During the 
fiscal year 1994-95 there has been a sharp increase of Rs. 17,496 
crore in Net Foreign Exchange Assets of RBI, which has been partly 
countered by a decline of Rs. 1,886 crore in net RBI credit to the 
Central government. Open market operations have been so timed that 
they do not conflict with the borrowing programme of the 
Government. In 1994-95, open market operations have led to a net 
sale of Rs. 1,032 crore. 
Due to slow down in foreign exchange inflows and large 
expansion in non-food bank credit, open market operations during 
1994-95 were lower than in the previous year. On face value basis 
the sale of securities by RBI from its portfolio in 1994-95 at Rs. 
2291 crore were far less than the sales (Rs. 9717 crore) in 1993-94. 
Purchases at Rs. 1440 crore were higher than the Rs. 1142 crore in 
1993-94. The net sales in 1994-95 were Rs. 748 crore compared to 
Rs. 9837 crore in 1993-94. 
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The close linkage between foreign exchange markets and short-
term money markets, observed in developed countries, manifested 
itself prominently for the first time in India in 1995-96. A sharp rise 
in industrial production increased demand for credit as well as for 
imports. The increased credit demand was reflected in rising call 
money rates and certificate of deposit rates, as well as in increased 
volatility of call rates. Rising imports and lower portfolio and aid 
inflows were not however reflected in exchange rate changes in late 
1994-95 or early 1995-96. This lack of comprehension by foreign 
exchange markets was manifested in falling 3 month and 6 months 
forwards premia during the early past of 1995-96. This contradiction 
between fundamentals (demand-supply) and market perception, 
resulted in increasing volatility in foreign exchange markets, 
followed by rising foreign exchange premia. In October-November 
1995, when lightened speculations led to excessive volatility RBI 
intervened by selling substantial amount of dollars. Such intervention 
reduces money supply by withdrawing rupee from the banking 
system, and raises inter-bank call money rates. A rise in short-term 
rates helps in stabilizing foreign exchange markets. Call money rates, 
however, rose to excessive heights, given the undeveloped state of 
the markets, necessitating a softening of the impact of the foreign 
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exchange intervene. RBI injected funds into the call market through 
reverse repos and refinance facilities to banks, against government 
and other approved securities. These measures stabilized the rupee 
dollar exchange rate and brought down the call money rate to 12-13 
percent by end November 1995. Repo auctions were resumed from 
November 4, 1996 and were effectively used for money market 
interventions. In order to absorb liquidity from the system and to 
even out call money rates a system of announcing calendar of Repos 
auctions on a monthly basis was introduced with effect from January 
13, 1997. The fixed rate repo was introduced with effect from 
November 29, 1997. The repo rate and the period of repo is 
announced by the Reserve Bank in the evening of the previous day. 
Initially, the repo rate was fixed at 4.5 percent but was successively 
raised in steps and reached 7.0 percent on December 11, 1997 and 
further to 9.0 percent on .lanuary 17, 1998. However, subsequently 
the repo rate was brought down in stages to 6 percent from April 30, 
1998. 
As a result of greater reliance of the Reserve Bank on open 
market operations the net sales of Government securities were much 
higher at Rs. 10,435 crore in 1996-97 as against Rs. 583 crore during 
1995-96 when tight monetary conditions prevailed in the economy. 
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The volume of securities available for open market operations was 
enhanced by converting special securities of value aggregating 
Rs. 20,000 crore at 4.6 percent into marketable securities of different 
maturities and interest rates: 10 year, 8 year, 7 year and 5 year 
maturities were compared at 13.05 percent, 12.59 percent, 11.19 
percent and 11.15 percent on June 3, 1997, June 18, 1997, August 12, 
1997 and September 1, 1997 respectively. Net sales of securities 
were lower at Rs. 3,154 crore during the financial year 1997-98, than 
that of Rs. 8,071 crore for the corresponding period of fiscal 1996-
97. The open market operations including repo activities went a long 
way in neutralizing excess liquidity in the banking system. 
Reflecting this, the net sales of Government securities during 1998-
99 till February 5, 1999 remained at a very high level of Rs. 25031 
crore against Rs. 3151 crore in the corresponding period of 1997-98. 
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2.4 The Reserve Requirements Policy of the Reserve Bank 
2.4.1 Introduction: 
Banks always keep a certain proportion of their total assets in 
the form of cash, partly to meet the statutory reserve requirement and 
partly to meet their own day-to-day needs for making cash payments. 
Cash is held partly in the form of 'cash on hand' and partly in the 
form of 'balances with the RBI'. All such cash is called cash reserves 
of banks, usually divided under two heads: (a) required reserves and 
(b) excess reserves. Required reserves are cash balances, which a 
bank is required statutorily to hold with the* RBI calculated on 
average daily basis over a fortnight. The modern purpose of statutory 
reserves, to serve as an instrument of monetary management, evolved 
and gained acceptance after World War-I. By changing the amount of 
member bank reserves, the amount of required reserves and the cost 
of borrowed reserves, the monetary authorities can exert a strong 
influence on the amount of money, and in lesser degree, on total 
money expenditures, employment, production and prices. 
2.4.2 Efficacy of the Reserve Requirement Policy: 
The statutory reserve requirements were originally sought to be 
enforced upon the commercial banks in India, as elsewhere, with 
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three objectives in view — (i) to ensure the liquidity and solvency of 
individual banks and therefore of the banking system, as a whole; 
(ii) to ensure to the Reserve Bank a supply of deposits and thus with 
adequate resources for its local operations; and (iii) to ensure that 
the Reserve Bank, using open market operations or other means 
should be able to influence and ultimately to restrict the commercial 
banks extension of credit. All these objectives are inter-related since 
an ultimate objective of credit control is to ensure the liquidity and 
solvency of the banking system as a whole. However, in the course of 
time, the first two objectives have come to be regarded as much less 
important than the third one. The important purpose of statutory 
reserve requirement is to endow the Central bank with an additional 
instrument of credit control. 
The control measure of variable reserve ratio attempts to affect 
the stock of money via the impounding or release of bank reserves. 
When the average CRR is revised upward, banks are required to hold 
larger reserves or balances with the RBI than before for the same 
amount of liabilities. This amounts to leaving the required reserve 
ratio unchanged but impounding of additional reserves by the RBL 
Since reserves are a part of high powered money (H), this amounts to 
a virtual withdrawal of a part of H from the public equal to the 
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amount of additional reserves impounded. Similarly when the CRR is 
lowered or the incremental CRR withdrawn, this amounts to releasing 
of reserves which would have been otherwise impounded and so 
virtual increase in H, the virtual changes in H is called adjusted H. 
This adjusted H serves as the base of the unchanged money-
multiplier. From the change in adjusted H we can estimate the 
resulting change in money supply (M) as well as the bank deposits 
attributable to the change in the required reserve ratio. 
Thus the essential function of changes in the required reserve 
ratio is to bring about derived changes in the effective/ adjusted 
amount of H and through it in the amount of money (and bank credit) 
and that, in this sense, the method of variable reserve ratio can act 
both as a supplement and as an alternative to other methods of 
monetary control. 
2.4.3 Statutory powers of the Reserve Bank: 
Under the original Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934, the 
Reserve Bank was given the statutory right to have with it, free of 
interest at all times, a cash reserve of not less than 5 percent of the 
demand liabilities and 2 percent of the time liabilities of every 
scheduled bank in India - the bank whose paid-up capital and 
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reserves would aggregate to not less than 5 lakhs of rupees and 
whose name is included by the bank in the second schedule of the 
Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934. 
In 1949, with the enactment of Banking Companies Act, every 
non-scheduled bank has also been obliged to maintain by way of cash 
reserve in cash with itself, or in account with the Reserve Bank, or 
partly in cash with itself and partly in such accounts a sum 
equivalent to at least 5 percent of its demand liabilities and 2 percent 
of its time liabilities (Section 18 of the Indian Banking Companies 
Act, 1949). Now under the existing, The Reserve Bank of India 
(Amendment) Act, 1956, the RBI is empowered to impose statutorily 
'Cash Reserve Ratio' (CRR) on banks anywhere between 3% to 15% 
of the net demand and time liabilities (NDTL) as of the last Friday of 
the second preceding week which changed to fortnight from March 
29, 1985. The CRR is a two-part requirement: One is certain 
percentage of Net Demand and Time Liabilities (NDTL) and other is 
10% of the increase in these liabilities known as Incremental Cash 
Reserve Ratio (ICRR) after November 11, 1984. On the additional 
required reserves over the minimum CRR of 3%o, the RBI pays 
interest to banks at a specified rate"^. 
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2.4.4 Pre-Liberalisation Phase; (Before 1991) 
The changes in reserve requirements form a powerful 
instrument for influencing the volume of bank credit and money. 
Such changes may not directly alter the total of reserves but they 
change the proportion of bank deposits that must be held as reserves 
with the Reserve Bank of India. Thus changes in the reserve ratio 
affect the liquidity position of member banks and consequently the 
amount available for lending or investing. These changes also affect 
the rate of multiple expansions of deposits in the entire banking 
system. 
The importance of reserve requirement in respect of credit 
control grows with the growth of bank money in relation to currency 
in circulation. The CRR, which was once considered as prudential 
requirements to safeguard the interests of banks and of depositors, 
increasingly became the active policy instrument particularly since 
1970s with the gradual downgrading of the Bank Rate as a policy 
instrument. The basic CRR was kept constant for 38 years during 
1935-72 while the SLR was changed only once during 1949-69. With 
the weakening fiscal position of the Central government there was a 
phenomenal increase in the reserve money and the major component 
of this increase was the rise in Reserve Bank credit to government on 
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which the Central bank had little control, resulting high inflation in 
the country. This inflationary situation prompted Dr. I.G. Patel, 
former Governor of the Reserve Bank of India to remark that, "/ 
think there is general agreement in India now that inflation is 
harmful both from the growth and equity point of view. Not long ago, 
there were at least some businessmen who advocated inflation as a 
deliberate policy to promote higher savings and investment and thus 
accelerate the pace of development" . In view of this, drastic 
monetary control measures were needed, and the only feasible 
approach to control the monetary expansion was to influence the 
value of money multiplier by raising the Cash Reserve Ratio. This 
was done repeatedly and the rise in the average money multiplier was 
more or less arrested after the mid 1970s and stabilized at a level 
slightly below 3.0. In fact the main burden of containing the growth 
of liquidity fell on the reserve requirements i.e. the Cash Reserve 
Ratio, because, the use of other policy instruments were very much 
limited, resulting unidirectional change which stood at the high of 25 
percent in 1991-92 as against the 3 percent in 1962, as shown in the 
table-2..5 
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TABLE-2.5 
Changes in Cash Reserve Ratio of Scheduled Commercial Banks 
Effective Date 
Julys, 1935 
March 6, 1960 
March 6, 1960 
November 11, 1960 
September 16, 1962 
June 29, 1973 
Septembers, 1973 
September 22, 1973 
June 29, 1974 
December 14, 1974 
December 28, 1974 
October 27, 1975 
September 4, 1976 
November 13, 1976 
January 14, 1977 
July 1, 1978 
Junes, 1979 
As percentage of Domestic Net Demand and Time 
Liabilities (NDTL) 
On Outstanding NDTL 
(a) 5% of demand liabilities 
(b) 2% of time liabilities 
(a) 5% of demand liabilities 
(b) 2% of time liabilities 
(a) 5% of demand liabilities 
(b) 2%of time liabilities 
(a) 5% of demand liabilities 
(b) 2% of time liabilities 
3% of demand and time 
liabilities 
5.0 
6.0 
7.0 
5.0 
4.5 
4.0 
4.0 
5.0 
6.0 
6.0 
6.0 
6.0 
On Incremental NDTL 
-
25% of the increase in total 
liabilities since March 11, 
1960 
50% of the increase in total 
liabilities since March 1 1. 
1960 
The above requirement was 
withdrawn 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
10% of increase in NDTL 
over the level as on January 
14,1977 
10% of increase in NDTL 
over the level as on January 
14, 1977 
10%) of increase in NDTL 
over the level as on January 
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October 31, 1980 
July 31, 1981 
August 21, 1981 
November 27, 1981 
December 25, 1981 
January 29,1982 
April 10, 1982 
June 11, 1982 
May 28, 1983 
May 30, 1983 
August 27, 1983 
November 12, 1983 
February 4, 1984 
October 27, 1984 
December], 1984 
October 26, 1985 
6.0 
6.5 
7.0 
7.3 
7.5 
7.75 
7.25 
7.0 
7.5 
8.0 
8.5 
8.5 
9.0 
9.0 
9.0 
9.0 
14, 1977 
The above measure was 
discontinued. The cash 
balances remained impounded 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
10% of increase in NDTL 
over the level as on 
November 11, 1983. 
Additional cash balances as 
on October 31, 1980 were not 
released. 
10% of increase in NDTL 
over the level as on 
November 11, 1983. 
Additional cash balances as 
on October 31, 1980 were not 
released. 
a) 10% of increase in NDTL 
over the level as on 
November 11, 1983 
b) 1/5' of additional cash 
balances impounded under 
lOT incremental CRR as on 
October 31, 1980 released in 
two equal instalments. 
a) 10% of increase in NDTL 
over the level as on 
November 11, 1983. 
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b) 1/3"^  of outstanding cash 
balances impounded under 10 
percent incremental CRR as 
on October 31, 1980 was 
released. 
November 22. 1986 9.0 a) 10% of increase in NDTL 
over the level as on 
November 11, 1983. 
b) Release of first instalment 
of one-half of remaining 
impounded balances under 
incremental CRR as on 
October 31, 1980. 
February 28, 1987 9.5 10% of increase in NDTL 
over the level as on 
November 11, 1983 
May 23, 1987 9.5 10% of increase in NDTL 
over the level as on 
November 11, 1983 
October 24, 1987 10.0 10%) of increase in NDTL 
over the level as on 
November 11, 1983 
April 23, 1988 10.0 a) 10% of increase in NDTL 
over the level as on 
November 11, 1983. 
b) The remaining balances 
under \0% incremental CRR 
as on October 31, 1980 was 
released. 
July 2, 1988 10.5 10% of increase in NDTL 
over the level as on 
November 11, 1983 
July 30, 1988 1.0 10%) of increase in NDTL 
over the level as on 
November 11, 1983 
July 1, 1989 15.0 
May 4, 1991 :5.o 10%) increase in NDTL over 
the level as on Mav 3, 1991 
Source: RBI Occasional Paper, Vol. 18, No. 2 & 3 (June - September), 1997 
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2.4.5 Post-Liberalisation Phase; (After 1991) 
In view of the acute foreign exchange situation and the 
consequent need to contain overall demand by moderating monetary 
expansion, an incremental cash reserve ratio of 10 percent was 
stipulated with effect from May 4, 1991 in addition to the cash 
reserve ratio of 15 percent. Simultaneously the unprecedented 
balance of payments Crisis (1991) emanating from high and 
prolonged fiscal and balance of payments deficits prompted the 
Government to take a number of policy measures which helped the 
economy to quickly recover and facilitate integration of the Indian 
economy with the world economy. In the financial sector, reforms 
were initiated following the recommendation of the committee on the 
Financial System (Chairman: Shri M. Narasimham), which submitted 
its report in 1991 . The reform measures addressed a number of 
issues such as: (i) improving the external constraints having a 
bearing on the profitability of the banks, (ii) strengthening banks and 
financial institutions through applications of prudential norms, and 
(iii) improving the competitiveness of banks and financial 
insti tutions. 
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Inconsonance with the objectives of financial sector reforms, it 
was considered feasible to moderate the levels of statutory pre-
emption in terms of both the cash reserve ratio (CRR) and statutory 
liquidity ratio (SLR). The cash reserve ratio was brought down from 
15 percent to 14 percent in two phases in April and May 1993. 
However, the build up of Reserve Bank of India 's foreign exchange 
reserves, resulting in an increase in primary liquidity, necessitated a 
temporary deviation from the medium term strategy and to sterilize a 
part of the foreign exchange inflow, the CRR was raised from 14 
percent to 15 percent in three phases from June 11 to August 6, 1994. 
With the abolition of the Foreign Currency (Non-resident) Accounts 
(FCNRA) scheme, there was a corresponding growth in deposits 
mobilized under other Non-Resident Deposits Schemes, leading to 
attenuation of the overall CRR. In view of this, for the first time a 
CRR of 7.5 percent, was required to be maintained by banks on 
liabilities under FCNR (B) from October 29, 1994. CRR was 
subsequently raised to 15 percent for FCNR (B) scheme and a CRR 
of 7.5 percent was introduced for the first time for the Non-Resident 
Non-Repatriable Rupee Accounts (NRNR) scheme, with effect from 
January 21 , 1995. With these conditions reversed and money growth 
slowing, the CRR was lowered to 14.5 percent effective November 
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11, 1995 and 14 percent effective December 9, 1995. Preferential 
CRRs for NRER, NRNR and FCNR (B) deposits, which were 
eliminated earlier, were reintroduced in 1995-96. This reduction in 
average CRR and in CRR against FCNR (B) deposits, which were 
eliminated earlier were reintroduced in 1995-96. This reduction in 
average CRR and in CRR against FCNR (B) account released about 
Rs. 5050 crore of cash balances to the scheduled commercial banks. 
Finally CRR on outstanding deposits was removed for FCNR (B) and 
NRNR schemes and CRR on outstanding NRE deposits was reduced 
to 10 percent from 14 percent with effect from the fortnight 
beginning January 6, 1996. These measures together augmented 
banks' resources by Rs. 2475 crore. The reduction of the CRR 
continued and reduced from 14 percent to 13 percent in two phases of 
0.5 percent point each, effective April 27 and May 11, 1996. The 
CRR on Non-Resident (External) Rupee Accounts [NR(E)RA] was 
brought down to zero. There was another phase of CRR reduction to 
12 percent, effective July 6, 1996. CRR was further reduced by one 
percent point in two phases of 0.5 percent point each to 11 percent 
effective from October 26, 1996 and November 9, 1996, respectively. 
Further one percent point reduction to 10 percent was made in two 
phases of 0.5 percent point each from the fortnight beginning January 
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4 and 18, 1997, respectively. All these reductions of CRR freed cash 
balances and augmented the lendable resources of the scheduled 
commercial banks. 
For developing the inter-bank call money market a new system 
to exempt them started from April 26, 1997 against the earlier 
practice of including positive net inter-bank liabilities as part of 
NDTL for CRR subject to a minimum of 3 percent CRR on overall 
NDTL. Reduction in CRR by two percentage points in eight phases of 
0.25 percentage point each was announced in 1997-98, but of the 
eight phases only the first two phases were effected on October 25 
and November 22, 1997, respectively. The development in the 
external environment tending to speculative activity and the 
pressures induced in the foreign exchange market resulted in the 
deferment of further CRR reduction till January 31 , 1998. The sale of 
US dollars resulted in contraction of liquidity, subsequently; 
liquidity was further tightened by raising CRR to 10 percent from 
December 6, 1997 and to 10.5 percent from January 17, 1998. 
However, after reviewing the monetary and credit situation it was 
reduced to 10.25 percent and 10.0 percent from the fortnight 
beginning rem March 28, 1998 and April 11, 1998 respectively. The 
CRR was reduced continuously in accordance with expansionary 
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monetary policy but in 2000 when rupee value fell beiow tiie 
psychological benchmark of Rs. 46 to the dollar the RBI decided to 
stabilize the rupee by choking off credit and rendering it more 
expensive by raising CRR to 8.5 percent from 8.0 percent. After this 
the CRR is reducing continuously and at present it is 4.5 percent 
which is likely to reach the minimum level of 3 percent with the 
objective of providing adequate liquidity to support investment 
demand in the economy while keeping an eye on inflation, as shown 
in table-2.6 and depicted in chart 2.3 
T A B L E - 2 . 6 
Changes in Cash Reserve Ratio of Scheduled Commercial Banks 
(Percent) 
January 11, 1992 
April 21, 1992 
Octobers, 1992 
April 17, 1993 
May 15, 1993 
June 11, 1994 
July 9, 1994 
August 6, 1994 
November 11, 1995 
December 9, 1995 
April 27, 1996 
15.0 
15.0 
15.0 
14.5 
1 
14.0 
14.5 
14.75 1 
15.0 
14.5 
14.0 
13.5 
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May 11, 1996 
July 6, 1996 
October 26, 1996 
November 9, 1996 
January 4, 1996 
January 18, 1997 
1998 
13 March 1999 
8 May 99 
6 November 1999 
20 November 1999 
8 April 
22 April 2000 
29 July 2000 
12 August 2000 
24 February 2001 
19 May 2001 
3 October 2001 
3 November 2001 
29 December 2001 
1 June 2002 
16 November 2002 
19 June 2003 
13.0 
12.0 
11.5 
11.0 
10.5 
10.0 
10.00 
10.5 
10 
9.5 
9 
8.5 
8 
8.25 
8.5 
8.25 
8.0 
7.5 
5.75 
5.5 
5 
4.75 
4.5 
Source: Reserve Bank of India Occasional Paper Vol.18 No. 2 & 3 
(June - September) 1997 and Annual Report 1998 to 2004. 
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2.5 Conclus ion: 
To conclude we can say that - monetary policy has an active 
role in the economy has been well recognized and cross-country 
experiences show that maintaining low and stable order of inflation 
should constitute the fundamental objective of the monetary policy. 
It emerged as the chief instrument of macroeconomic stabilization as 
well as a vehicle for the subsequent structural reforms in the 
financial system. The growing integration of various markets and 
increasing globalisation called for reforms in the monetary policy 
operating framework in terms of instruments, procedure and 
institutional architecture. Replacement of ad hoc Treasury Bills by a 
System of Ways and Means advances provided monetary policy the 
necessary flexibility. In order to improve the efficiency of resource 
allocation, the operating procedure shifted from administered and 
direct instruments of monetary control towards indirect instruments. 
The open market operations has been reactivated and the bank rate is 
being used as the signaling rate. This transformation has been 
facilitated by wide ranging reforms in the government securities 
market, and in the interest rate structure, coupled with reduction in 
the reserve requirements. The reforms also touched upon institutional 
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and structural areas of monetary and financial policy. These should 
go a long way in realizing the twin objectives o f - price stability and 
adequate provision of credit for the productive sectors of the 
economy. 
Lastly we conclude that though all the three instruments have 
their own merits but no single instrument is adequate to the task; 
instead all the three need to be employed in proper combination. In 
the changing conditions monetary authorities be empowered to use 
discretion in choosing the proper combination of instruments to 
achieve policy objectives, but no rigid legal formula with respect to 
techniques of control can be expected to apply effectively to 
unknown future conditions. The table-2.7 clearly shows the active 
utilization of different instruments simultaneously for effective 
monetary management. 
TABLE-2.7: Monetary Policy Instruments 
Instruments/ Decade 
Cash Reserve Ratio 
Standing Facilities 
Credit Control 
Open Market Operations 
Bank Rate 
1950s 
^/ 
/ 
^/ 
^ 
1960s 
^/ 
/ 
/ 
y 
1970s 
V' 
/ 
V 
^ 
/ 
1980s 
^/ 
V 
V 
1990s 
^/ 
Sector-specific refinance 
de-emphasised 
Phased out 
Reactivated in 1992-93 
Reactivated in 1997-98 
Note: /denotes an active use of the instruments. 
Source: Report on Currency and Finance, RBI (2003) 
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SELECTIVE METHODS OF MONETARY MANAGEMENT 
3.1 Introduction: 
In exercising general instruments of monetary management the 
aim of the Reserve Bank is primarily to affect the cost and 
availability of bank-credit in general without regard to its 
distribution in particular directions. But the problem of credit control 
in India, as elsewhere, is not only to regulate the total quantity or the 
cost of credit but also to prevent its overflow in particular directions. 
Thus the regulation of credit for specific purposes is termed as 
selective methods. It has two main aspects: positive and negative. On 
the positive front, methods can be used to encourage greater 
channeling of credit into particular sectors. On the negative side, 
methods are taken to restrict the flow of credit to particular sectors 
or activities. All demands made for bank credit are not 'legitimate ' in 
the sense of being essential to the genuine demands of development. 
Some of them may be for socially unimportant or even harmful 
purposes. The risk of antisocial use of credit becomes particularly 
serious when the money supply in the economy is substantially 
expanding and prices are tending to rise because production and 
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economic activity are lagging behind. On such occasions it becomes 
profitable for producers or traders to hold on to their stocks in a 
rising market, and if bank credit is freely available to them for 
financing such carrying of stocks, hoarding and profiteering are 
encouraged. The tendency of prices to rise is aggravated and, 
moreover, the keen demand for bank-credit for speculative purposes 
further extends money supply and stimulates its unhealthy pressure 
on the economy. Under great pressure the banker ' s efforts can be 
defeated by the seepage of money from good uses to bad and at most 
times the channels of credit are sufficiently embanked by market 
imperfections to make selective methods worthwhile. In the context 
of planning and development, selective method is necessitated to 
canalize bank credit to socially desirable and economically useful 
purposes befitting the broad objectives of the plan. In such 
circumstances, the Central Bank has to step in and see that bank 
credit is not abused. It has to discriminate between different types of 
borrowers and the purposes for which they are borrowing. It has to 
see that bank finance does not become easily available for the 
speculative holding of stocks, while doing nothing, which will 
withhold funds from genuine business needs. "The good banker is 
one who can distinguish the sound from the unsound borrower. His 
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whole life is spent in selecting, in deciding which lines of activity 
may be safety supported, as well as distinguishing the wise and 
honest from the foolish men and knaves." This is the selective 
aspect of credit control in the field of monetary management. 
Even in advanced countries it has been realized that the control 
of distribution, as distinct from quantitative variations in the total 
supply of credit, which was formerly regarded as outside the sphere 
of Central Bank is essential for an anti-cyclical monetary policy. In a 
developing country like India the need for selective control is far 
greater than in an advanced country, because of varying degrees of 
responsiveness of the different sectors of the economy to changes in 
money supply and the rate of interest. Qualitative Control of the flow 
of credit into different channels can work more effectively than 
quantitative changes. To quote an expert, "restricting money where 
non-essentials were concerned and releasing money where essentials 
were concerned is a wise policy of the Central Bank."^ 
3.2 Statutory Powers to the Reserve Bank of India: 
In India, no provision was made in the Reserve Bank of India 
Act, 1934 to equip the Reserve Bank with the powers of selective 
credit control methods. The provisions with regard to purchase and 
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rediscounting of 'eligible bills' may had some qualitative 
implications on the distribution of bank loans, the inclusion of such 
provision, was inspired more by the desire to confirm to the practices 
of the bank of England and to improve banking standards rather than 
to any conscious efforts to introduce qualitative credit control. An 
abnormal expansion of bank loans to the stock market occurred in 
1946 when the Reserve Bank of India had to issue warnings to all 
banks reminding them of the dangers of granting too large a 
proportion of loans against stocks and shares. In his speech at the 
Annual General Meeting the Governor of the bank regretted that, 
"this warning does not seen to have been heeded in some quarters. " 
The Governor stated that, "the bank did not posses the power to deal 
with the situation. "^ The statutory provision in this direction was, 
therefore, made in September 1948, more than a decade after the 
birth of the bank, when the banking companies (control) ordinance 
authorized the Reserve Bank to issue directives to banks in regard to 
their lending policies in general and any transaction in particular. 
Later in 1949, with the enactment of banking legislation, permanent 
powers were conferred upon the bank to effect selective credit 
control in the country. Section 21 of the banking companies Act, 
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1949, empowered the Reserve Bank to control and direct advances by 
banking companies. The section reads as: 
(1) Where the Reserve Bank is satisfied that it is necessary or 
expedient in the public interest so to do, it may determine the policy 
in relation to advances to be followed by banking companies 
generally or by any banking company in particular, and when the 
policy has been so determined, all banking companies or the banking 
company concerned, as the case may be, shall be bound to follow the 
policy as so determined. 
(2) The Reserve Bank may give directions to banking companies, 
either generally or to any banking company or group of banking 
companies in particular, as to the purposes for which advances may 
or may not be made, the margins to be maintained in respect of 
secured advances and the rates of interest to be charged on advances, 
and each banking company shall be bound to comply with any 
directions as so given. 
Section 20 (3) of the banking companies act also authorizes the 
Reserve Bank that " / / any loans or advances are granted by any 
banking company to the detriment of the interests of the depositors, 
the bank may, by order in writing, prohibit the banking company 
from granting any such further loans or advances and may by like 
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order direct the banking company to secure the repayment of any 
such loans or advance within such time as may be specified in the 
order. " 
Section 36 of the same act further empowers the Reserve Bank 
to prohibit banking companies against entering into any particular 
transactions. The section reads as: The Reserve Bank may caution or 
prohibit banking companies generally or any banking company in 
particular against entering into any particular transaction or class of 
transactions and generally give advice to any banking company. 
The Reserve Bank has been also empowered to issue directives 
to banking companies in relation to matters of policy or 
administration in the national interest or in the interests of the 
institutions themselves. The section 35 A"* of the Banking Companies 
Act reads as: 
Were the Reserve Bank is satisfied that in the national interest; 
or to prevent the affairs of any banking company being conducted in 
a manner detrimental to the interests of the depositors or in a manner 
prejudicial to the interest of the banking company; or to secure the 
proper management of any banking company generally; it is 
necessary to issue directions to banking companies generally or to 
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any banking company in particular, it may from time to time, issue 
such directions as it deems fit, and the banking companies or the 
banking company as the case may be shall be bound to comply with 
such directions. 
3.3 Techniques of Selective Credit Controls: 
3.3.1 Credit Rationing: This method is adopted only when the 
country is facing exceptional and serious monetary crisis or when 
gold reserves decline. In this method, the Central Bank imposes 
restrictions on demand of accommodation for more credits by the 
commercial banks. The Central Bank limits the credit available to 
each of the commercial banks. Thus, this method of credit rationing 
also directly affects the credit granting capacity of the commercial 
banks. 
3.3.2 Fixation of Margin Requirement: The margin is the difference 
between the "loan value" and the "market value" of securities 
offered by borrowers against secured loan. By prescribing the margin 
requirements on secured loans, the Central Bank does not permit the 
commercial bank to lend to their customers the full value of 
securities offered by them but only a part of their market value. 
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3.3.3 Publicity and Notifications: The 'Central Bank' publishes 
weekly reports, periodicals, reviews, the statement of assets-
liabilities and balance sheets for the guidance and reference of 
commercial banks. These publications provide latest information for 
the money market, public fiance activities, trade and industries. From 
these data, the commercial banks can plan and adjust their credit 
activities. 
3.3.4 Direct Action: The method of direct action is most extensively 
used by Central Banks to implement their credits. This method can be 
used to enforce both quantitative as well as qualitative credit control 
by the Central Bank. 
3.3.5 Moral Suasion: Moral suasion is the policy of the RBI of 
persuasion and pressures used on commercial banks to do certain 
things or refrain from doing certain things. This is exercised through 
discussions, letters, speeches and hints thrown to banks. The RBI 
sends periodical letters to banks urging them to reduce their advances 
against particular commodities or unsecured advances. Frequent 
discussions are also held for this purpose. The RBI has been able to 
build a good informal relation with the banks over the years. Moral 
suasion had proved quite useful in exercising control over credit 
supply in the country. 
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The selective credit controls in India have been used to prevent 
the speculative hoardings of essential commodities like food grains 
and agricultural raw materials to check the undue rise in their prices. 
A restricted availability of bank credit for financing the purchase and 
holding of some commodities will restrict the capacity of traders to 
hold their stocks. This will improve the market supply of 
commodities and will thereby check the price rise. At present, the 
RBI fixes minimum margins to be maintained by commercial banks in 
respect of their advances against food grains, oilseeds, vegetable 
oils, cotton, sugar, cotton textile, etc. The RBI operates the selective 
credit controls under the directive powers conferred on it by the 
Banking Regulation Act. The techniques of selective credit controls 
used generally are: 
(i) Minimum margins for lending against securities. The margins 
vary from the low of 20% to the high of 75% in 1997. The RBI fixed 
a minimum margin of 45% on bank advances against stock of wheat 
as against minimum margins of 10% and 15% for advances against 
levy and free sugar, respectively. 
(ii) The RBI fixes ceilings on maximum advances to individual 
borrowers against certain stocks of goods. Commercial banks are 
required to get the permission of the RBI to grant loans to new 
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borrowers and increase the credit limits in the case of existing 
borrowers. 
(iii) Minimum discriminatory rates of interest are charged on certain 
types of advances. 
(iv) The RBI prohibits clean advances for financing the hoarding of 
sensitive commodities. 
(v) The RE I^ prohibits the discounting bills covering sale of 
sensitive commodities. 
3.4 Sectoral Allocation of Credit: 
The policy of sectoral allocation of credit has undergone 
several changes from time to time over the past 50 years. The full 
period may be subdivided into three sub-periods: 
• Pre-nationalisation period: 1951 - 1968 
• Post- nationalisation period: July 1969 - 1991 
• Post-liberatlisation period: After 1991 
3.4.1 Pre-nationalisation Period: (1951- 1968) 
The economy is generally divided into four sectors: 
(i) Agriculture (ii) Industry (iii) Trade and (iv) Others. Whenever 
necessary, each sector can be further sub-divided into smaller sub-
sectors, such as large and medium-scale industry and small-scale 
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industry. During the pre-nationalisation period (1951-68) there has 
been a dramatic increase of credit in the Industry and decline in the 
trade and others. The share of industry in bank's credit rose rapidly 
from 34 percent in 1951 to 51 percent in 1961 and to 67.5 percent in 
1968. On the other hand the share of trade declined from 36 percent 
to 19 percent and that of the miscellaneous category from 28 percent 
to 11 percent. The factors responsible for shift in advances pattern 
operated on both the demand and supply sides of bank credit. On the 
one hand, the state policy, under the framework of a mixed economy 
and five-year plans initiated in 1951, sought the industrial 
development of the country largely through the promotion of large 
industries in the corporate sector. On the other hand, large industry 
and established business houses, because of their ownership and 
control of big commercial banks, could claim easily an increasing 
proportion of the incremental bank credit and banks themselves were 
perfectly happy to fall in line. 
Throughout the period (1951 - 68) agriculture continued to 
command a very low proportion of total commercial bank credit, 
firstly because commercial banks were reluctant to provide such 
credit and so were not geared to that end and secondly because as a 
matter of deliberate policy the needs of agricultural credit were 
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supposed to be met by the cooperative credit system. But the severe 
shortage of food grains production in the country and the consequent 
need for proraoting the High Yield Variety Programme (HYVP) and 
to support the weaker sections on political considerations, pressures 
came on the RBI to provide adequate refinance to the cooperative 
credit system. The RBI as the Central Banking authority considered it 
inadvisable to stretch its help beyond a reasonable limit and there 
were inherent organizational and structural limitations on the 
cooperative banking system in raising its own resources, a multi-
agency approach for the provision of agricultural credit with 
commercial banks as the other source of credit came into existence, 
and the State Bank of India (SBI) was assigned the role of providing 
credit to agricultural marketing and processing societies. 
3.4.2 Post-nationalisation Period: (July 1 9 6 9 - 1 9 9 1 ) 
The classification that divides the economy into only two broad 
categories: (i) priority sectors and (ii) non-priority sectors was 
adopted for policy purposes for the first time in l968 . Initially, on the 
recommendation of the National Credit Council, three sectors -
agriculture, small industries and exports were recognized as priority 
sectors. Later on, road and water transport operators, professional 
and self employed persons, retail trade and small business, and 
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education were also included into the priority sector. The targets of 
priority sector credit for public sector banks were set and revised 
from time to time as a matter of government policy. Thus the 
increasing emphasis on credit to 'priority sectors' and emergence of 
food credit (i.e. credit for the procurement of food grains) as an 
important item has led to the reallocation of sectoral credit from 
what it was in the pre-nationalisation period. 
There has been a persistent decline in the share of bank credit 
from scheduled commercial banks to industry as a whole and to large 
and medium industry in particular. The share of industry decreased 
from 67.5% in March 1968 to 48.8% in March 1986. The share of 
large and medium industry declined from 60.6% in March 1968 to 
34.7%) whereas the share of small industry rose from 6.9%) in March 
1968 to 14.1% in March 1986. With the increased diversification in 
industry, the structure of industry wise allocation of bank credit has 
also undergone changes - the relative shares of textiles, engineering 
and sugar have declined and those of newer industry groups have 
improved. 
With the rising trend in the domestic output of food grains, 
market surpluses of food, public distribution of food grains, public 
procurement of food, and the size of buffer stocks of food, a rising 
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share of bank credit has taken the form of food advances. In March 
1968, the amount outstanding of food advances of Rs. 109 crores 
constituted only 3.5% of total advances of scheduled commercial 
banks, which increased to Rs. 5600 crores constituting about 10% of 
total advances in June 1979. In order to encourage banks to meet the 
growing demand, the RBI not only issued appropriate guidelines to 
banks, but also offered them its refinance facilities. Under the RBI 
policy, food advances enjoy priority over other advances as well as 
concessional rate of interest. 
In view of the paramount need to promote exports to earn 
sufficient foreign exchange to be able to meet the country 's large and 
growing foreign exchange obligations, several measures have been 
adopted: 
To induce banks to increase their credit for exports, the RBI 
has been providing increasingly liberal refinance to them for such 
credit and at low concessional rate of interest. 
The RBI has been fixing credit ceilings from time to time and 
requiring commercial banks to observe specified incremental net non-
food credit-deposit ratio. 
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All export credit from scheduled commercial banks, pre-
shipment as well as post-shipment, used to be offered at very low 
concessional rates of interest. 
Under the Integrated Rural Development Programme (IRDP) 
banks provided terms loans to identified poor families. This 
programme was started in 1978-79 as a major poverty alleviation 
programme and the objective was to take above the poverty line the 
families in the identified target groups by creating substantia! 
employment opportunities in rural areas and by enabling them to 
acquire productive assets with the help of government subsidy and 
term loans from banks. In consonance with this objective during the 
6 " plan period, term loans of Rs. 31,000 crores were disbursed by 
banks to about 16.6 million families against the target of 15 million 
families. 
3.4.3 Post-liberalisation Period: (1991 onwards) 
The 1990s opened with a severe balance of payments crisis and 
a high rate of inflation, reflecting the growing internal imbalances of 
1980s. The Reserve Bank responded swiftly with monetary and credit 
measures aimed at import compression and demand containment. 
With the liberalization of the external sector, the management of 
capital flows posed a fresh challenge to monetary management. The 
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Reserve Bank absorbed surplus capital flows in its balance sheet in 
order to maintain the export competitiveness of the economy and at 
the same time attempted to sterilize the monetary impact. During 
1994-95, the evolution of prices and output led to a t ightening of 
selective credit controls on a number of goods from May 16, 1994. 
Minimum margin on bank advances against pulses, oilseeds and 
vegetable oils and Cotton and Kapas were, raised by 15 percentage 
points. The credit ceiling on them was reduced from 100 percent to 
85 percent of the peak level during the three-year period ending 
October 1993. The concessional margin of 10 percent for bank 
advances (with state guarantee) to state level cooperative institutions 
was raised from 10 percent to 25 percent. But in the mid year review 
that expected a bumper Kharif crop, the selective credit controls on 
bank advances against paddy/ rice were eliminated. With the sign of 
improvement in price-output trends in Cotton/ Kapas, the minimum 
margins on bank advances against these commodities were reduced 
by 15 percentage points and the credit ceiling raised from 85 percent 
to 100 percent of each borrower 's peak level of credit during the 
three year period ending October 1993. There was no change in the 
selective credit controls imposed by RBI against price sensitive 
essential commodities during financial year 1995-96 (Table-3.1). 
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At the beginning of the financial year 1996-97, there was an 
across the board liberalization of selective credit controls on bank 
advances against price-sensitive essential commodities. In the 
context of the favourable price-supply situation, bank advances 
against a large number of price-sensitive essential commodities, were 
exempted from selective credit controls from October 21 , 1996. 
These commodities include pulses, other food grains (coarse grains), 
oilseeds (viz. groundnut, rapeseed/ mustard, cottonseed, linseed, 
castorseed), oils there of including vanaspati, all imported oilseeds 
and oils, sugar, gur and khandsari and cotton and kapas to 'others' 
(other than cotton mills including spinning mills). However, selective 
credit controls were retained for advances against buffer stock and 
unreleased stocks of sugar-to-sugar mills. In the case of unreleased 
stocks of sugar, the margin was reduced from 20 percent to 15 
percent, effective October 21 , 1996, while in the case of buffer stock 
of sugar, the existing prescription of a zero percent margin 
continued. The above explanations are summarized in the table-3.2. 
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The selective credit controls were virtually eliminated in 
October 1996, the only exception being advances against buffer stock 
of sugar and unreleased stock of sugar-to-sugar mills. In order to 
counter temporary deterioration in price supply situation, selective 
credit controls were re-imposed only for a period of three months 
(April 8 - July 7, 1997) on bank advances against stocks of wheat. A 
minimum margin 45 percent was stipulated on bank advances against 
(a) stocks of wheat to mills and processing units and (b) warehouse 
receipts covering wheat stocks and a higher margin of 60 percent was 
imposed on advances to others, i.e. parties other than mills and 
processing units. A credit ceiling of 100 percent of the peak level of 
bank credit maintained by the party in any of the three years 
commencing 1993-94 (November-October) was also set. Effective 
from October 22, 1997, differential minimum margin of 10 percent 
and 15 percent were stipulated for advances against levy and free 
sale sugar respectively, leaving advances against buffer stock free 
from margin. During the financial year 1996-97 out of the total 
increase in gross non-feed credit of Rs. 19742 crore, 35.3 percent 
(Rs. 6,972 crore) flowed to medium and large industries, 19.4 percent 
(Rs. 3,830 crore) to agriculture and 11.3 percent (Rs. 2,229 crore) to 
small scale industries. 
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During 1997-98, out of the total increase in non-food gross 
bank credit amounting to Rs. 36404 crore, 41.0 percent (Rs. 14926 
crore) flowed to medium and large industries, 9.4 percent (Rs. 3427 
crore) to agriculture and 20.8 percent (Rs. 7564 crore) to small scale 
industries. The outstanding export credit of scheduled commercial 
banks as on March 27, 1998 stood at Rs. 34430 crore forming 10.6 
percent of total outstanding Net Bank Credit (NBC) as against 
Rs. 30112 crore forming 10.8 percent of NBC as on March 28, 1997. 
As on December 4, 1998 aggregate export credit of banks was Rs. 
34873 crore (10.3 percent of NBC). Effective from the fortnight 
beginning January 17, 1998, banks were provided export credit 
refinance upto 50 percent of the increase in outstanding export credit 
eligible for refinance over the level of such credit as on February 16, 
1996. After reviewing the monetary and foreign exchange situation, 
the export credit refinance limits were restored to 100 percent of the 
incremental export credit eligible for refinance with effect from May 
9, 1998. In order to ensure internationally competit ive interest cost 
for exporters, RBI advised banks on June 11, 1998 to limit the spread 
to 1.5 percentage points over LIBOR on foreign currency loans (as 
against LIBOR + 2.0/2.5 points earlier). 
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The proportion of food credit in the flow of gross bank credit 
increased from 15.1 percent in 1999-2000 to 20.9 percent in 2000-01, 
whereas the corresponding proportion during April - October 2001 
was as much as 37.7 percent compared with 23.6 percent in the 
corresponding previous period. The non-food gross bank credit 
flowed to the priority sectors in 2000-01 was 41.8 percent and credit 
to the industry was 28.7 percent. The corresponding figure for 1999-
2000 was lower at 34.5 percent in the case of priority sectors while it 
was higher at 33.7 percent in respect of the industry sector. The flow 
of credit to the wholesale trade (excluding food procurement) was 
lower at 1.9 percent in 2000-01 than that at 5.7 percent in 1999-2000. 
The share of non-food credit flowing to medium and large industry 
and wholesale trading during April-October in 2001-02 was lower at 
23.0 percent and 0.3 percent than the level of 46.2 percent and 3.6 
percent, respectively, in the corresponding period of the previous 
year, whereas the flow of credit to housing and consumer durables 
during this period exceeded that in the corresponding previous 
period. Responding to the implications of international developments 
in September 2001, the Reserve Bank effected a reduction in the 
ceiling rate an export credit by one percentage point for a period of 
six months ending March 31 , 2002. As regards export credit 
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refinance limit, the refinance limit increased from Rs. 7,350 crore in 
April 2001 to Rs. 9297 crore as on November 30, 2001 . Scheduled 
commercial banks have been assigned targets and sub targets under 
the system of priority sector lending in order to ensure timely flow of 
credit to vital sectors like agriculture and SSI, and to cater to the 
credit requirements of the weaker sections. In the case of domestic 
banks (Public and Private) aggregate advances to the priority sector 
should constitute 40 percent of the total Net Bank Credit (NBC). The 
sub-target in respect of agriculture is 18 percent of NBC, while that 
in respect of weaker sections islO percent. (Table-3.3) 
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3.5 Conclus ion: 
Thus to conclude we can say that: In the context of planning 
and development, selective credit control is necessary to channelise 
bank credit to socially desirable and economically useful purposes 
befitting the broad objectives of the plan. In a country like India, 
where the resources are very much limited it becomes essential to use 
these resources in the most efficient way. In India the selective credit 
controls have been used mainly to prevent speculative hoarding of 
essential commodities like food grains and agricultural raw materials 
to check an undue rise in their prices. Since May 1956 selective 
credit controls are in operation in India and have expanded in 
coverage, scope and content over the period. But the degree of 
success of Selective Credit Controls (SCCs) are very much dependent 
upon the factors like - the extent of effective credit restrictions, 
because, the SCCs are generally security-oriented and not purpose 
oriented. 
The availability of non-bank finance - Traders may not depend upon 
banks for financing their inventories and have other sources of 
finance such as black money. 
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The degree of shortfall in supply in relation to normal demand - if 
the shortfall will be greater, greater will be the speculative fever. 
All these will definitely jeopardize the basic purpose of selective 
credit controls. 
Therefore, if the selective credit controls are to succeed in 
preventing the rise in prices of sensitive commodit ies, they have to 
be accompanied by general credit controls aimed at reducing the 
capacity of banks to lend money. The end-use or purpose of all credit 
ought to be taken into account by the banks and credit advanced 
accordingly if selective credit controls are to be effective. 
As the selective credit controls are focused mainly on credit to 
traders for financing inventories, the RBI generally ensures that 
credit for production movement of commodities and exports is not 
adversely affected by such controls. It has made frequent changes in 
its s e c directives with changing market condit ions, but it is very 
difficult to have definite information about the degree of success or 
failure of the SCCs. However, there is a general audacity that they do 
moderate speculative pressures on the prices of sensitive 
commodities to some extent. 
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TRANSMISSION OF MONETARY POLICY 
4,1 Introduction: 
The design and conduct of monetary policy has an important 
bearing on aggregate economic activity, cyclical fluctuations in 
economic activity are a feature of the behavior of most economies, 
and so an understanding of their patterns and causes is important to 
the decisions of both policy makers and market participants. Thus the 
main objective of macroeconomic policy is the avoidance of 
protracted recessions in which resources go under-utilized, and of 
periods of unsustainable growth that can jeopardize the price 
stability. There is widespread acceptance that monetary policy is 
being actively considered as an instrument of stabilization, working 
through aggregate demand to smoothen oscillations of economic 
activity around the desired path. 
The transmission mechanism depicts as to how monetary policy 
affects output and inflation, which are the final objectives of 
monetary policy. The monetary policy action imparts to the ultimate 
objectives through two broad sets of channels - financial prices (such 
as, interest rates, exchange rates, yields asset prices, equity prices) 
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and financial quantities (money supply, credit aggregates, supply of 
government bonds and foreign denominated assets etc.) . Though 
these channels are not mutually exclusive, the relative importance of 
each channel may differ from one economy to another depending on a 
number of factors including the underlying structural characterist ics, 
state of development of financial markets, the instruments available 
to monetary policy, the fiscal stance and the degree of openness. 
With the erosion of the stability of money demand and the 
explanatory power of monetary aggregates on account of financial 
innovations, globalisation and the growing sophistication of financial 
markets, monetary authorities have increasingly resorted to interest 
rates, to the almost complete exclusion of monetary or reserve 
aggregates, both as sources of information for determining policy as 
well as operating instruments for conducting monetary policy. Now a 
days, the main operating instruments for most Central banks is 
(i) a short-term interest rate. Markets are the deepest in the short-
end, allowing Central Banks to intervene in support of policy 
objectives without generating serious repercussions on market 
activity. The impulses from the short-end are transmitted quickly 
across the term structure of interest rates and this makes for 
efficiency in intervention. The experience has shown that Central 
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Banks have been proactively moving target interest rates in support 
of output/ employment and financial stability considerations, even if 
this has meant a temporary departure from their commitment to price 
stability. Therefore, the interest rate channel emerges as the 
dominant transmission mechanism of monetary policy. It induces 
movements in other asset prices to generate wealth effects, in terms 
of market valuations of financial assets and liabilities, like through 
exchange rates - higher interest rates induce an appreciation of the 
domestic currency which, in-turn, leads to a reduction in net exports 
and hence, in aggregate demand and output. 
4.2.1 Real Interest Rates: 
The real interest rate assumes critical importance in the 
transmission of monetary policy to growth. The classical view of the 
real interest rate is being determined by the real forces of saving and 
investment and unaffected by variables like monetary growth or 
inflation that does not fit well with the operational conduct of 
monetary policy. Given wage and price rigidities, monetary factors 
can influence real interest rates in the short run and even in the long 
run, variations in the rate of monetary growth can have effects on 
real interest rates through Tobin-Mundell Portfolio effects. Similarly 
as per Keynesian view, the interest rate is purely a monetary 
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phenomenon, which is determined in the money market is also a 
partial explanation of the determination of interest rate. The third 
concept that reconciles the two approaches is a 'neutral rate of 
interest' — a rate consistent with the stock and flow equilibrium of 
households and firms at the natural rate of growth of the economy. 
The synthesis identifies a host of real and monetary factors such as; 
savings, investment, technology and other preference shocks, stance 
of fiscal policy, the stance of monetary policy and its interventions, 
credit restraints, the efficiency of the financial system and the degree 
of financial liberalization as determinants of real interest rates in a 
general equilibrium framework. There is a growing acceptance that 
there is no unique fundamental equilibrium real long term interest 
rate. Empirical evidence for the US, the UK, France and Germany 
suggests that the real interest rate increased from 1980s onwards over 
the levels prevailing during the 1950s and 1960s. The low real 
interest rates during the 1950s and 1960s caused by the greater 
policy weightage assigned to output expansion, whereas, the surge in 
real rates from 1980s onwards reflected tighter monetary policy to 
contain inflation. Higher real interest rates since the 1980s also 
reflected a looser fiscal policy stance and an overall tendency 
towards deregulation of financial markets. 
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The issue of the appropriate real interest rates for India has 
ieved a growing focus with the switch over from a planned 
K o n o m y to a market determined economy in the context of financial 
sector reforms. The Committee to Review the Working of the 
Monetary System (RBI, 985) recognized that the depositor need to be 
assured of a 'reasonably high positive real rate of interest' on 
savings to deter 'leakages' of financial saving in the form of gold, 
real estate and physical assets. Therefore, it recommended a real 
posit ive interest rate of up to 3 percent depending upon maturity, 
issuer and instrument marginally positive real return on 91-day 
Treasury Bills, a positive real return of 2 percent per annum for bank 
deposits of maturity of 5 years or more and a positive real return of 3 
percent per annum on 15-year government dated securit ies. There is 
also an influential view that the optimum real interest should be 
closer to the expected long-term growth rate of the economy. 
4.2,2 Nominal In te res t Ra tes : 
In India, interest rates as an instrument of monetary policy, 
were activated in the 1990s. With the financial sector reforms, the 
monetary management has been extensively relying upon the use of 
indirect instruments like interest rates and open market operations 
including repos. In the pre-reform period, the Bank Rate had a 
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limited role as a monetary policy instrument. It was activated and 
made as a signaling and reference rate in April 1997 attaching it to 
rates at which accommodation is provided by the Reserve Bank. The 
changes in the Bank Rate are seen as an integral part of the monetary 
policy stance of the Reserve Bank announced from time to time and 
prepare a direction to general level of interest rates in the system. 
With the Reserve Bank's stance to move away from the sector 
specific refinance schemes, the liquidity in the system is managed 
largely through the Liquidity Adjustment Facility (LAF). The 
operating procedures of the LAF including auction methods and 
periods are being refined periodically to make it more efficient. With 
a procedure for a smooth transition of call money market into a pure 
inter-bank market, the liquidity support available from the Reserve 
Bank has been rationalized. As such, the repo and reverse repo rates 
emerging from the LAF auctions essentially reflect the market 
conditions of availability of liquidity in the system along with the 
rate at which the liquidity is available from the Reserve Bank. The 
LAF injects/ absorbs liquidity on a day-to-day basis in a flexible way 
and in the process provides a corridor for the call money and other 
short-term interest rates. The deposit interest rate structure has been, 
by and large, deregulated except the savings deposits rate, which is 
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prescribed by the Reserve Bank. Commercial banks have been given 
virtual freedom to determine their lending rates. The interest rates, 
particularly at the short-end of the market, are more aligned and 
integrated. 
A contractionary monetary policy is reflected in an increase in 
the nominal short-term interest rate. As wages and prices take time to 
adjust to the interest rate change, the higher nominal interest rates 
translate into higher real short-term as well as long-term interest 
rates which lessen investment and consumption leading to a fall in 
aggregate demand and contraction in output. Over a period of time, 
as wages and commodity prices begin to adjust, aggregate demand is 
restored and real activity, the real interest rate and the real exchange 
rate return to their fundamental levels. 
Thus, the interest rate is treated as the principal instrument of 
monetary policy in consonance with monetary policy operating 
procedures all around the world under which monetary authorities 
adjust interest rates in response to economic developments . The 
interest becomes an overall index of financial condit ions and all 
financial prices move in a stable and predictable way with changes in 
the policy rate." 
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4.3 Growth - Inflation Trade-off: 
For monetary policy to be effective in supporting the revival , it 
must exert a systematic effect on economic activity, i.e., output, 
employment, real interest rates and real exchange rates. Thus, the 
question of what monetary policy can or cannot do in the context of 
the deceleration is inextricably linked to the debate on the issue of 
neutrality of money. Though by and large, the debate on the 
neutrality of money remains unsettled but the swings in the paradigm 
across the spectrum of the debate have been a powerful force in 
shaping the stance and conduct of monetary policy. Till the 1950s, 
monetary policy was subordinated to fiscal policy. Expansionary 
fiscal policy supplemented by the discretionary financing of fiscal 
deficits by monetary policy and keeping interest rate low to stimulate 
investment was the preferred combination due to the dominance of 
Keynesianism after the Great Depression of 1929. But the influential 
work on the US economy in 1960s, showed that peaks and troughs of 
money supply changes systematically preceded the peaks and troughs 
of economic activity, leading upto the premise that monetary policy 
has powerful effects on real variables in the short run.'^ Accordingly, 
the debate produced a transitory synthesis during the 1960s and the 
1970s within the dominance of the Keynesian paradigm. Money 
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started to matter and Central banks began to employ monetary policy 
to reduce fluctuations in real variables. Several developed countries 
including the USA, Canada and Britain pursued expansionary 
monetary policies. But the massive oil price hike of 1973 stepped up 
global inflation and the persistent high unemployment rates led to the 
stagflation. The stagflation of the 1970s fuelled skepticism about the 
beneficial effects of expansionary monetary policy. The counter-
revolution, were led by Milton Friedman, the keeper of the 'living 
tradition' of the classical faith. Continuous inflation was found to be 
largely or solely the result of excessive monetary growth. Expanding 
the Phillips Curve with expectations showed that the trade-off 
between unemployment and inflation could possibly exist in the short 
run; in the long run, however, there was no trade-off. Further, it was 
argued that long and variable lags in the operation of monetary 
policy can destabilize the impact of counter-cyclical monetary policy 
and accordingly the desired short run impact was virtually 
unpredictable. The expansionary monetary policy to fight a down 
turn can take effect when the economy is booming. All this led to the 
advocacy for resisting the temptation to exploit the possible short run 
trade-off and to set up a rigid rule fixing the growth rate of money 
stock to the trend growth rate of output. Thus, the first half of the 
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1970s was characterized by a considerable amount of uncertainty 
regarding the conduct of monetary policy and the ability of policy 
makers to 'fine tune' the economy. But in the second half of the 
1970s and up to the mid-1980's, monetary targeting became the 
raison d'etre of the conduct of monetary policy. Empirical 
investigation turned out systematic evidence of stability in the money 
demand function, which strengthened the case for using monetary 
aggregates as the intermediate target since changes in money supply 
could be traced to predictable changes in prices, interest rates and 
income. Money supply rules were also seen as a means of securing 
freedom from fiscal policy by eschewing discretionary actions. 
Germany, Switzerland and the USA were the first to adopt monetary 
targets in the operating framework of monetary policy in 1975, 
followed by Canada in 1976, and France and Australia in 1977. In 
1980s, many developing countries also adopted various formulations 
of the money rule. 
In the latter half of the 1980s, Central banks all over the world 
were experimenting with a variety of operating instruments and 
analytics with a broad preference for indirect instruments and a 
market orientation of monetary policy. Beginning in 1989, a number 
of countries have put in place institutional settings for directly 
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achieving the primary target of monetary policy-inflation. While 
inflation targeting has been characterized alternatively as 
'constrained discretion' and 'the interest rate analog of a money 
growth rule', it has opened up a number of dilemmas for practitioners 
of monetary policy, i.e., the lack of complete integration into 
economic theory, the neutrality hypothesis and the relationship 
between growth and inflation. Growing recognition of the powerful 
effects of monetary policy on the real economy has implied that 
monetary authorities have been forced to take positions on the short 
run trade-off between growth and inflation and the choice severely 
conditioned by the losses of macroeconomic welfare that can arise as 
a result of an inappropriate position along the growth-inflation curve. 
This choice has become even more severely constrained given the 
conviction that this curve has non-linear segments, implying that 
growth and inflation are positively related along a certain portion of 
the curve, and negatively related elsewhere, as shown in the chart 4.1 
Growth 
Inflation 
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In business cycle terminology, this means that growth and inflation 
are both pro-as well as counter cyclical. At the operational level, it 
implies that inflation at low levels is beneficial for growth by 
'greasing the wheels ' of the economy, but there is a point beyond 
which inflation becomes inimical for growth. In recent years, 
monetary authorities have increasingly come out of the closet to 
reflect growth considerations, both explicitly and implicitly, in their 
objective functions. Even in countries, which have adopted inflation 
targets as the goal of monetary policy, output considerations are 
explicitly incorporate in their monetary policy frameworks. 
4.3.1 The International Experience: 
Multiplicity of objectives entails assignment of degrees of 
importance, depending on the hierarchy of macroeconomic priorities. 
A proximate starting point to the resolution of the dilemma is the 
identification of the threshold/ optimal level of inflation beyond 
which it has negative effects on growth. Empirical investigations of 
the location of the threshold have proliferated in the literature since 
the 1970s. Early efforts were based on estimating Phi l l ips ' curve 
type relationships with high frequency data. Consequently, the 
threshold inflation was estimated under growth accounting 
frameworks. The empirical affirmation produced in the second half of 
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1990s suggests that there exists a significant and negative correlation 
between high inflation and growth. Inflation instability is robustly 
and negatively correlated with growth variability at high levels of 
inflation. In industrialized countries the threshold rate of inflation is 
placed in the range of 1 - 3 percent. Several recent studies 
incorporating developing countries, including India, have empirically 
located threshold inflation rates in the range of 8 percent to 40 
percent. The range is relatively wide because measured productivity 
in the traded sectors in these Countries is generally higher than in the 
non-traded sectors. Measuring threshold inflation in a cross-country 
framework runs the risk of being influenced by extreme values since 
samples include countries with inflation as low as 1 percent and as 
high as 200 percent and even higher. That ' s why it will be 
appropriate to estimate threshold inflation for each country 
separately in order to avoid the risk of being influenced by extreme 
values. 
4.3.2 The Indian Experience: 
In the face of oil price hikes and agricultural supply shocks, 
there was a considerable concern about inflation in the 1970s, but 
there was a lack of consensus about the tolerable rate of inflation.' ' 
The reference of the Chakarvarty Committee to 4 percent as the 
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acceptable rise in prices can be regarded as the first influential fix on 
the threshold rate of inflation in India Testing for the threshold 
within the framework of a macro-econometric model suggested a 
range of 5 to 7 percent, initially 6 - 7 percent and eventually 5 - 6 
percent. Employing a variety of methodologies, studies conducted in 
the Indian context obtain a range from 4 to 7 percent for the 
threshold inflation rate. The lower bound of 4 percent regarded as 
output neutral inflation rate with the positive effects of inflation 
petering off after 7 percent. There is not much empirical support for 
the trade-off between the anticipated rate of inflation and output 
growth although the negative effects of inflation on output are 
robustly confirmed. A recent study suggests that for inflation up to 
6.5 percent, the growth objective of monetary policy can take 
precedence over the price stability objective. However, once the 
inflation level reaches 6.5 percent, price stability objective should be 
given greater relative importance. But with prolonged price stability 
at the global level as well as in India, the threshold rate is expected 
to move downv/ards. 
Several empirical studies conducted for estimating the 
threshold inflation for India show that the results are sensitive to the 
methodology, the period of study and the choice of possible factors 
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determining growth or conditioning variables. There is no unanimity 
on the specification of the appropriate model for estimating the 
growth - inflation relationship, possibly because the relationship 
itself is changing fairly rapidly. The monetary authorit ies should try 
and ensure that the inflation rate stabilizes in the 'near-
neighbourhood' of its threshold level. For this an optimal rate of 
money growth becomes essential because there is a long run 
relationship between money, inflation and growth. This relationship 
is represented by an equation. 
n, = //, - T\ g, 
Where, n: is the rate of inflation, ^t is the rate of money supply, 
Y is the income elasticity of money demand and gt is the rate of 
growth. 
Lets assume that: 
r = 1.25 
n = 5% (threshold level) 
g = 7- 8% (targeted) 
If we put all these values in the given equation, then the 
optimal level of monetary expansion would be around 14-15 percent. 
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Money supply less than this may decrease the growth rate and lead to 
recession whereas money supply greater than this will rise the 
inflation and jeopardize the price stability objective. Thus, the 
results broadly suggest that money growth of about 14 to 15 percent 
would be sufficient to ensure that economic activity is maximized 
without fueling inflationary expectations. 
4.4 Conclusion: 
Thus we conclude that with financial l iberalization and 
globalisation, the relationship between money output and prices has 
turned increasingly volatile and unpredictable. Long and variable 
lags in monetary policy and changeable transmission channels have 
posed a considerable challenge for the conduct of monetary policy. 
As a result various Central banks have abandoned monetary targeting 
and experimented with a number of different nominal anchors, such 
as interest rates and the exchange rate, which could provide a fix on 
inflation. The growing complexities of monetary management during 
the 1990s required that the formulation of monetary policy be based 
on the information gathered from a large number of macro-economic 
indicators rather than being predicated on a single monetary 
aggregate. Thus, in view of the changing monetary dynamics, the 
Reserve Bank of India formally switched from monetary targeting 
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and broad-based its list of policy indicators in April 1998. The 
Monetary and Credit Policy Statement of April 1998 announced that 
the Reserve Bank would: "Adopt a multiple indicator approach 
wherein interest rates or rates of return in different markets (money, 
capital and government securities markets) along with such data as 
on currency, credit extended by banks and financial institutions, 
fiscal position, trade, capital flows, inflation rate, exchange rate, 
refinancing and transactions in foreign exchange available on high 
frequency basis are juxtaposed with output data for drawing policy 
perspectives. " 
Although the exclusive use of monetary aggregates has been 
de-emphasized, it remains an important indicator of the monetary 
policy stance, with the monetary and credit policy statements 
announcing monetary projections for the year. It continues to be 
relevant for India simply because of two basic reasons. First, since 
the money demand function has remained reasonably stable, it 
remains helpful in predicting price movements with reasonable 
accuracy at least over a period of time.^ Secondly, the money stock 
target is relatively well understood by the public at large, with the 
money supply target, the stance of monetary policy is unambiguously 
defined and gives a clear signal to market participants. The table-4.1 
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and the chart 4.1a and 4.1b clearly depict the stable relationship 
between money supply and price level. The correlations and 
coefficient between M3 and inflation also shows the same 
relat ionship. During the first half of the nineties, there is a strong 
positive relationship between money supply and inflation but in the 
second half of the nineties due to the sterilization policy inflation 
remained under control. 
Therefore, in the context of Indian economy, the quantity of 
money continues to play an important role in determining prices. 
However, the monetary authority must watch the behavior of interest 
rates in various markets and must intervene and smooth the 
volatili ty. At the same time, it is necessary to decompose the sources 
of inflation in view of the repeated occurrence of supply-side shocks 
in the economv since the late 1990s. 
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TABLE-4.1 
MONEY SUPPLY, INFLATION AND GROWTH 
1990-1991 to 1999-2000 
Year 
1990-9] 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-
2000 
Growth Rates 
Real GDP 
5.4 
0.8 
5.3 
6.2 
7.8 
7.6 
7.8 
5.0 
5.8 
6.0 
r*=-0.465 
r**=0.547 
Inflation 
(WPI) 
10.32 
13.90 
10.00 
8.40 
10.90 
7.80 
6.40 
4.80 
6.00 
3.20 
Money 
Supply 
(M3) 
15.10 
19.30 
15.70 
18.20 
22.20 
13.20 
16.00 
17.00 
13.20 
14.60 
(Ii 1 Percent) 
3-Year Moving Average 
GDP 
3.83 
4.10 
6.43 
7.20 
7.73 
6.80 
6.20 
5.60 
r**=-0.43 
r**=0.796 
Inflation 
(WPI) 
11.40 
10.76 
9.76 
9.03 
8.36 
6.33 
5.73 
4.66 
Money 
Supply 
(M3) 
16.70 
17.73 
18.70 
17.86 
17.13 
15.40 
15.40 
14.93 
*Correlation between inflation and growth 
** Correlation between inflation and money supply 
Source: Economic Surveys, Govt, of India (1990-2001) 
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CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS 
To conclude we can say that in the contemporary 
macroeconomic thinking, there is no clear winner. No doctrine can 
claim universal dominance once enjoyed by Classicals, Keynesians or 
Monetarists. The Central banking community has had to compete 
with a radical transformation of the financial environment originating 
from the impact of liberalisation and financial innovations. Such as, 
wide ranging deregulation, globalisation of finance and acceleration 
of competitive pressure leading to a mind boggling variety of 
financial instruments and a spectacular rise in the volume and value 
of transactions. There is no doubt that the conduct of monetary 
policy shaped the process of financial sector reforms, but financial 
liberalization itself posed fresh challenges to the conduct of 
monetary management. Though the battle against inflation was won 
by the latter half of the 1990s, domestic growth declined to 5.0 
percent levels during 1996-1997 to 2001-2002 from 7.0 percent 
levels during 1993-1994 to 1995-1996, which forced the institution 
of an easy liquidity regime to stimulate investment demand. The 
evolution of interlinked money, government securities and foreign 
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exchange markets, posed challenges to monetary management in 
terms of heightened risks of contagion. The transition from a planned 
economy to a market economy sharpened the Reserve Bank 's 
monetary policy dilemma of providing credit to both the government 
and the commercial sector at a reasonable cost, while at the same 
time containing inflationary pressures. 
Despite generalized recognition of price stability as the 
primary goal of monetary policy of most of the Central banks, there 
is little evidence that inflation targeting on an average improves 
performances of output. Though it is clear that inflation has a non-
linear relationship with the economic growth. The global inflationary 
trend, which shows a continuous decline in the inflation rates of 
different countries including India are shown in the table-5.1 and 
also depicted in the chart 5.1. 
T A B L E - 5 . 1 ; 
Global Inf lat ionary Trends 
Country 
USA 
Japan 
European Union 
India 
East Asia 
South Asia 
1993 
3.0 
1.3 
3.5 
6.4 
5.3 
6.8 
1994 
2.6 
0.7 
2.9 
10.2 
6.2 
10.1 
1995 
2.8 
-0.1 
2.8 
10.2 
5.8 
10.3 
1996 
2.9 
0.1 
2.3 
9.0 
5.3 
9.0 
1997 
2.3 
1.8 
2.0 
7.2 
4.6 
7.5 
1998 
1.6 
0.7 
1.5 
13.2 
13.0 
11.6 
(CPI in Percent) 
1999 
2.2 
-0.3 
1.2 
4.7 
3.4 
4.9 
2000 
3.4 
-0.7 
2.3 
4.0 
1.1 
4.1 
2001 
2.8 
-0.7 
2.5 
3.4 
3.7 
3.6 
Source: World Economic Outlook, IMF, September, 2003. 
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Chart-5.1: Global Inflationary Trends 
(CPI) 
"USA —'< ""Japan A European Unton • K ™ India —Hi ' • East Asia • • ' South Asia 
It means up to a certain level inflation is beneficial for the economic-
growth and beyond that it becomes harmful for the economy. Thus 
there is a need to have an appropriate fix on the acceptable level of 
the inflation in India. In the 1970s, the average annual inflation rate, 
as measured by the WPI was 9 percent and real GDP growth rate was 
2.9 percent. In the 1980s, inflation rate was 8 percent while real GDP 
growth rate was 5.9 percent. In the 1990s the average inflation rate 
was 8.07 percent and the real GDP growth rate was 5.77 percent. In 
fact the objective of the policy is to keep the inflation rate near to 
the threshold level, which is accepted in the range of 4 - 5 percent 
estimated from the different methods. The developing economics like 
India are subject to greater supply shocks than developed economies. 
185 
Fluctuations in agricultural output have an important bearing on 
prices. However, continuous increase in prices cannot occur unless it 
is sustained by a continuing increase in money supply. Therefore the 
monetary growth must be so moderated that meeting the objective of 
growth does not push inflation rate beyond this tolerable level on an 
average. 
Thus we can say that though the price stability is of prime 
importance, growth is equally a matter of policy concern. Although 
the two objectives are mutually reinforcing in the long run, short-run 
trade-offs are often live and real, especially in case of structurally 
constrained economies. It is in this context. Governor Jalan has 
summed up. "There is a growing consensus now-in theory as well as 
in practice that Central Bank should have instrumental 
independence, and concentrate on a single target of inflation control 
with the use of a single instrument. The position, no doubt, is 
theoretically sound, but as I look at the history of economic thought 
and changing fashions in economic policy making, I must confess lo a 
sense of discomfort on whether the current dominant view on 'one 
target, one instrument' will survive the test of time. In developing 
countries this whole question of trade-off-particularly at the margin 
and during periods of external or domestic uncertainties, becomes 
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even more relevant because of a large non-monetised and 
agricultural economy. It seems to me that a certain amount of target 
flexibility and balancing of conflicting objectives are unavoidable " 
(December, 2000) 
Therefore, the hypothesis that Central bank should pursue a 
single target single instrument is rejected. 
Since the financial instability is the core of economic 
instability as demonstrated by the recent financial crises in Asia, 
Russia, Brazil, Turkey and Argentina, and the Central bank, being 
placed at the nucleus of the financial system, has a vital role to play 
in restoring and maintaining financial stability. The role of the 
Central bank in maintaining financial stability varies cross-
sectionally according to the stage of development of the economy as 
well as overtime, for a given economy. This is due to the fact that 
domestic financial system is subject to different kinds of shocks -
both home grown and external, depending upon the degree of its 
integration with the global economy. The financial liberalization and 
technological advances coupled with special characteristics of 
developing countries have not only increased the scale of financial 
transactions significantly, but have also greatly enhanced the 
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inherent risks associated with them, especially by making the 
transmission of panic easy and fast and often spilling over to other 
economies. For instance, in 1996 - that is just before the outbreak of 
the Asian financial crisis - short-term debt as percentage of foreign 
exchange reserves had shot up to 100 percent for Thailand, 177 
percent for Indonesia, and as much as 203 percent for Korea, which 
made the financial crisis much more severe. Whereas, short term debt 
as percentage of foreign exchange reserves was only 8 percent for 
India, which explains the resilience of the Indian financial system 
during the recent financial crisis. In this context, Governor Jalan 
remarked in the mid-term review of the monetary and credit policy 
for 1998-1999 that: "The financial crisis in south-east Asia and 
Japan has brought to the fore the problems that weak and fragile 
domestic financial sector can pose for the real economy. It is now 
established beyond reasonable doubt that while a persistent and 
unexpected down turn in the real economy creates difficult problems 
for the financial sector, a fragile financial sector can deepen the real 
economy crisis and impose heavy social costs. It is, therefore, of 
utmost importance to strengthen capital adequacy, income 
recognition and provisioning norms for banks as well as other 
financial institutions and to move towards full disclosure and 
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transparency in banking operations in line with international best 
practice. 
The external sector strategy based on - a sustainable current 
account balance, sufficiency of reserves, stability of reserves, 
stability in the foreign exchange market, and prudent external debt 
management has paid rich dividends in terms of attaining 
macroeconomic stability, that was demonstrated during the South-
East Asian crisis, wherein the Indian economy came out relatively 
unscathed. There is no doubt that the judicious management of the 
external sector in India is one of the success stories of the 1990s. 
The most visible indicator of this success story has been the sharp 
increase in foreign exchange reserves to US$ 75 billion as at end 
March 2003, equivalent to an import cover of 14 months from an 
import cover of 2 months in 1990-91, which has now crossed to US$ 
100 billion. The external debt to GDP ratio has improved from 38.7 
percent in 1991-92 to 20.0 percent in 2002-03. This became possible 
due to a conscious policy entailing a cautions and prudent approach 
towards external debt management. The Reserve Bank has been 
refining its supervisory framework by buttressing the traditional 
onsite supervisory practices with off-site supervision and 
increasingly, risk-based supervision. The Reserve Bank instituted a 
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supervisory strategy comprising on-site inspection, off-site 
monitoring and control systems internal to the banks. In order to 
exercise integrated supervision over the financial system, the Board 
for Financial Supervision (BFS) with Advisory Council was 
constituted on November 16, 1994. Under the Reserve Bank of India 
(BFS) Regulations, 1994.it has been gradually developing a risk-
based supervision methodology in line with international best 
practices. Banks have been advised to voluntarily build in risk-
weighted components of their subsidiaries into their own balance 
sheets on a notional basis from year ended March 2001. Besides 
developing a supervisory rating based on the CAMELS methodology 
for domestic banks and the CALS methodology for foreign banks for 
optimizing scarce resources, the Reserve Bank has put in place a 
framework for Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) based on early 
warning triggers. 
Thus we can say that the Indian financial system on the whole, 
is in sound health and the Reserve Bank's record of financial 
stability is indeed impressive. Therefore instead of pursuing a single-
target single instrument rule, it is important that Central banks must, 
at any time, simultaneously pursue three objectives of price stability, 
growth and financial stability. Though these objectives are mutually 
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reinforcing in the long run, the challenge of contemporary Central 
banking is to manage their short run conflicts and trade-offs. 
If we have to judge the efficacy of monetary management by a 
single criterion, definitely it should be the inflation performance of 
the economy. Considering the need for development finance in a 
capital scarce economy monetary management need to be evaluated 
in an integrated framework in terms of the inter-relationship among 
money, output and prices. During the 49-year period from 1951-52 to 
1999-2000, broad money (M3) expanded at an average annual rate of 
13.5 percent while the real GDP grew at a rate of 4.45 percent and 
the inflation rate (measured as variations in the whole sale price 
index, WPI) at 6.62 percent. As shown in the table-5.2 and chart 5.2. 
TABLE-5.2 
MONEY SUPPLY, INFLATION AND GROWTH DECADE WISE 
(In Percent) 
Year 
1951-5210 1959-60 
1960-61 to 1969-70 
1970-71 to 1979-80 
1980-81 to 1989-90 
1990-9! to 1999-2000 
Growth Rates 
Real GDP 
3.6 
4.0 
2.9 
5.9 
5.77 
Inflation (WPI) 
1.20 
6.30 
9.0 
8.0 
8.07 
Broad Money (M3) 
6.20 
9.20 
17.70 
17.20 
16.45 
Source: RBI Occasional Papers, Vol. 18 No. 2 & 3 (June & September, 1997) & 
Economic Survey 1997-2001. 
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V a r i a t i o n s in IVIoney S u p p l y , I n f l a t i o n & G r o w t h ( D e c a d e - w i s e ) 
P e r c e n t a g e 
1 9 5 1 - 5 2 t o l 9 5 9 - 6 0 1960 -61 t o l 9 6 9 - 7 0 1970 -71 t o l 9 7 9 - 8 0 1 9 8 0 - 8 1 t o l 9 8 9 - 9 0 1 9 9 0 - 9 1 t o I 9 9 9 - 0 0 
Y e a r 
. D R c a l G O P • I n f l a t i o n ( W P 1) O H o n c y S u p p I y (M 3 ) 
In terms of inflation performance, the decade of 'fifties' was the best 
and 'seventies' was the worst. In terms of overall macroeconomic 
performance also the seventies was perhaps the worst. During this 
decade the M3 accelerated to 17.7 percent per annum, with a 
preponderant effect on prices, as the inflation rate rose on an average 
to 9.0 percent a year and the average real GDP growth plummeted to 
a little under 3.0 percent. During the 'Nineties' the first half was 
highly disturbing because the inflation was continuously in double 
digit and GDP growth was low and monetary expansion was very 
high. However, in the second half of the 'Nineties' the Reserve Bank 
was able to control it effectively which results in the considerable 
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reduction in the inflation rate, slowing down in the monetary 
expansion and moderate increase in the real GDP growth rate. The 
reform process has helped accelerate the healthy economic growth of 
the 1980s in a more sustainable manner, bolstered by greater 
competit iveness and efficiency gains. Real gross domestic product 
(GDP) grew at 6.2 percent during the reform period (1992-93 to 
2002-2003) higher than that of 5.6 percent in the pre-reform decade 
(1981-82 to 1990-91). Per capita income grew at 3.9 percent in the 
reform period as against 3.2 percent in the pre-reform period 
result ing in a healthy reduction in the poverty ratio. In totality, 
India ' s reform, programme has had a definite positive and significant 
impact on the economy as compared with the past. A plot of 3-year 
moving averages of variations in money output and prices for the 49-
year period from 1951-52 to 1999-2000 brings out this point vividly, 
showing pointers to what constitutes prudent monetary management. 
The table-5.3 and the chart 5.3a and 5.3b depict the above 
explanations. 
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TABLE-5.3 
MONEY SUPPLY, INFLATION AND GROWTH 
(In Percent) 
Year 
1951-52 
1952-53 
1953-54 
1954-55 
1955-56 
1956-57 
1957-58 
1958-59 
1959-60 
1960-61 
1961-62 
1962-63 
1963-64 
1964-65 
1965-66 
1966-67 
1967-68 
1968-69 
1969-70 
1970-71 
1971-72 
1972-73 
1973-74 
Growth Rates 
Real GDP 
. 2.33 
2.84 
6.09 
4.17 
2.64 
5.69 
-1.21 
7.59 
2.19 
7.08 
3.10 
2.12 
5.06 
7.58 
-3.65 
1.02 
8.14 
2.61 
6.52 
5.01 
1.01 
-0.32 
4.55 
Inflation 
(WPI) 
6.51 
-12.78 
4.46 
-6.71 
-5.23 
13.79 
3.03 
4.12 
3.95 
6.52 
0.00 
4.08 
5.88 
11.11 
7.50 
13.95 
11.56 
-0.91 
3.69 
5.34 
5.63 
10.13 
20.34 
Money 
Supply 
(M3) 
-6.56 
-0.75 
3.72 
8.14 
12.78 
6.93 
-10.25 
9.90 
11.71 
2.09 
7.06 
7.28 
10.63 
9.15 
11.57 
11.13 
9.43 
11.34 
12.41 
18.03 
15.18 
18.28 
17.39 
3-Year Moving Average 
GDP 
3.75 
4.36 
4.30 
4.16 
2.37 
4.02 
2.85 
5.62 
4.12 
4.10 
3.42 
4.92 
5.43 
1.65 
1.83 
3.92 
5.75 
4.71 
4.18 
1.90 
1.74 
1.79 
Inflation 
(WPI) 
-0.60 
-5.01 
-2.49 
0.61 
3.86 
6.98 
3.70 
4.86 
3.49 
3.53 
3.32 
7.02 
8.16 
10.85 
11.00 
8.20 
4.78 
2.70 
4.97 
7.05 
11.95 
18.49 
Money 
Supply 
(M3) 
-1.19 
3.70 
8.21 
9.28 
3.15 
2.19 
3.78 
7.90 
6.95 
5.47 
8.32 
9.02 
10.45 
10.61 
10.71 
10.63 
11.06 
13.92 
13.67 
15.63 
16.97 
15.53 
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1974-75 
1975-76 
1976-77 
1977-78 
1978-79 
1979-80 
1980-81 
1981-82 
1982-83 
1983-84 
1984-85 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-200 
1.16 
9.00 
1.25 
7.47 
5.50 
-5.20 
7.17 
6.10 
3.10 
8.25 
3.77 
4.08 
4.28 
4.32 
10.65 
6.89 
5.40 
0.80 
5.30 
6.20 
7.80 
7.60 
7.80 
5.00 
5.80 
6.00 
25.15 
-1.13 
2.11 
5.10 
0.00 
17.27 
18.22 
9.29 
4.90 
7.63 
6.38 
4.41 
5.82 
8.21 
7.45 
7.39 
10.32 
13.90 
10.00 
8.40 
10.90 
7.80 
6.40 
4.80 
6.00 
3.20 
10.92 
14.99 
23.58 
18.45 
21.90 
17.74 
18.10 
12.51 
16.62 
18.23 
18.96 
15.99 
18.63 
15.99 
17.79 
19.36 
15.10 
19.30 
15.70 
18.20 
22.20 
13.20 
16.00 
17.00 
13.20 
14.60 
r*=-0.063 r**=0.250 
4.90 
3.80 
5.90 
4.74 
2.59 
2.49 
2.69 
5.46 
5.79 
5.04 
5.37 
4.07 
4.23 
6.42 
7.29 
7.64 
4.35 
J . O J 
4.1 
6.43 
7.2 
7.73 
6.80 
6.20 
5.6 
14.78 
8.73 . 
2.09 
2.46 
7.46 
11.77 
14.87 
10.80 
7.24 
6.30 
6.17 
5.57 
6.15 
7.11 
7.68 
8.39 
10.50 
11.40 
10.76 
9.76 
9.03 
8.36 
6.33 
5.73 
4.66 
14.43 
16.50 
19.00 
21.30 
19.33 
19.23 
16.10 
15.73 
15.77 
17.93 
17.73 
17.87 
16.87 
17.47 
17.73 
17.43 
17.43 
16.70 
17.73 
18.70 
17.86 
17.13 
15.40 
15.40 
14.93 
r*=-0.176 r**=0.486 
*Correlation between inflation and growth 
** Correlation between money supply and inflation 
Source: RBI Occasional paper Vol.18, No. 2 & 3 (June & Sept.), 
1997 and Annual Reports, 1998 to 2003. 
195 
u . 1 _ r ! ! 
SZ 
4 - * 
^ 
o ^ 
06 
c 0 
• H ^ 
4 - > 
iS 
* • -
c 
^ ^ ^ " ^ 
^•" 0 
^ 0 
Q. 0 
0 CN| 
3 a, (/) en 
>»2 0) ' ^ 
c 0 0 -^ 
.E r^  
0 ^ 
< 4 - ' 
(C 
L . 
(0 
> 
(0 
CO 
ir> 
1 
OS 
s: 0 
i r .^%. ! 1 1 1 
r <%-, 1 
^ % 
^"•"Z^^ 
\ % 
\ 
^V 
<9P 
-5^  
~5V, 
• % 
' ^ -
^ ^* . 
^ ^ Fl . "^  
T T ^ I 
^Li " <^ , 
1 f—%, 1 _ _ _ L - 7 r ^ 
/n^^-^^ 
—^_- . 
"SU^" BJJ4 • C ^ 
• ^ ^ ™ i 
K ^ ^ 
" "^-n 
- % 
- % 
'5'CL 
• • % > 
'^-^^ 
% 
\ 
^ , 
<& 
*^-
% 
34 ^ 1 
i 
1 
Q-
Q. 
3 
CO 
>-
' flJ : 
1 i ° 
1 
k 1 
1 
1 
1 
I 
i 
1 
1 
Jl T 
0 
% 
1 i 
1 
T 
Q 
CD 
1 T 1 T 
1 : 
1 : 
1 
! 1 
1 1 
1 1 
\ 
i i 
< ! 
i 
'•vP, 
0 in 0 in 0 m o / „ i n 0 in 
196 
.^—^  
o 
o 
o 
1 
o> 
a> 
I J^ 
D ^^ 
> ^ 
05 1 \ 
o i 
+- 1 
CM 
1 
m 
•4-< 
o 'w 
b: o 
^ 0 ) V 
I 1 
1 % i 
r _% 
r <%>, " 1 
1- <? 
' •%, ! 
1 •%^ ' 
' ^ f ^ . " ! 
I r A, 
V ^ ^ ^ ""<^ 
^ • - - ^ ^6> 
<%>. 
% 
11 [ % 
"^> 
L %. 
^ ' ^ ^ l ~ ^ i T •^ (K:, 
c > i < J / f ^ • ^ "^  
o < ' >- ^L--« ^ % \ ^ o) 1 ^v^. 1 ^ — ^ t s r % ' 
^ C ^ v l •— 
> « - — 
^ > i 
— o ! 
^ S i 
Q . »- ; ; \ d 
-^  s_ i ' r 
i .£ 
; _o 
• 3 
« 
'^ 1 5 
, . 
SI 
CO 
lO 
1 
r e j r 
o 1 
i 
' / 1 £1 i 
^ ! <-
r-v. ^-e,. i 1 ^ ^ 
1 ( 
» ! ^-J^ ' 
. 1 ^ i 
>v ^ ^ " \ 
1 \V^~nii 
^ ^ fll 
^ x 
• % 
• ^^. i 
< ? r . i 
^^ I 
I<\M f *^^  ! 
< 5 r ' \ \ 
^^-^ 
^^ 
^ 
\ 
""^ T 
^ A ! 
(?o^ ! 
•0* "^z <%>. 
% 
# ^ ^ ^ N . 
^""fiL^.^ 
1 X^"^^*"-^.^ 
: 
• ^ ^ 
— 4r<^^ ! 
' ^ , 
in o m o in o y . in CM <M • < -
~^ 
-i>. • 
^ + 
' a. 
a O 
jusojad 
197 
Therefore, in a globalized world the monetary management has 
become much more complex and interdependent. A key factor that 
guides the conduct of monetary management is how to achieve the 
benefits of market integration while minimizing the risks of market 
instability. An integral component of Central bank work is the 
development of financial markets that can increasingly shift the 
burden of risk mitigation and costs from the authorities to the 
markets. Central banks need to take into account, among others, 
developments in the global economic, inflationary and interest rate 
situations, exchange rate movements and capital movements while 
formulating monetary policy. In fact, the hazard of conducting 
modern day monetary policy is that, if you meet expectations, the 
markets get disappointed. Thus monetary policy has a dual task of 
economic and expectations management. The additional challenge of 
monetary management in the current macro environment is to keep 
the long rates stable while reducing the rates at the short end. 
Lastly, we conclude that the record of the Reserve Bank in 
monetary management has been on balance satisfactory. In fact, it 
will be appropriate to conclude that the degree of credibility that the 
Reserve Bank has earned overtime, is in itself an effective instrument 
of monetary policy in meeting the future challenges. 
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